World Order in the Post-Cold War Era:  The Relevance and Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years by Gassama, Ibrahim J.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 1
1-1-1994
World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The
Relevance and Role of the United Nations After
Fifty Years
Ibrahim J. Gassama
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 Brook. J.
Int'l L. 255 (1994).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol20/iss2/1
ARTICLES
WORLD ORDER IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA: THE RELEVANCE AND ROLE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER FIFTY
YEARS
Ibrahim J. Gassama*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE POST-WORLD WAR II SYSTEM IN CRISIS
The United Nations (UN) will celebrate its fiftieth anniver-
sary on June 26, 1995.' This celebration will take place at a
time when the world organization is coming under increasing
scrutiny because of its perceived failures in resolving post-Cold
War conflicts. The end of the Cold War has been accompanied
by numerous comparatively minor but deadly disputes which
have placed greater and greater demands on the UN structure
and resources.2 These added demands are to a large extent
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; J.D. Har-
vard Law School; BA. Virginia Tech. I would like to express my deepest apprecia-
tion for the exceptional insights and comments provided by Michael Axline, Robin
Morris Collin, Garrett Epps, Leslie Harris and L. Hope Lewis. I am also indebted
to Kevi Brannelly, Anthony Gould, and Denise Wiyaka, third-year students at the
University of Oregon Law School, for their valuable research assistance.
1. The UN Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco by repre-
sentatives from fifty countries who had met from April 25 to June 26 to draft the
Charter. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4-9
(1969). International discussions on the establishment of an international organiza-
tion had begun even before the United States entered the Second World War in
December 1941. Id. at 2-4; DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 73-79
(1990). The basic proposals for the Charter were developed at a conference which
met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., from August 21 to October 7, 1944.
MOYNIHAN, supra, at 73. For more on the negotiations leading to the founding of
the United Nations, see ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS: THE ORIGINS
OF THE UN AND THE SEARCH FOR POSTWAR SECURITY (1990).
2. The cost of peacekeeping operations during 1992 is estimated at nearly
three billion dollars. An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
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being fostered by a recognition that the UN is now a major
player-and perhaps ought to be the dominant player-in the
resolution of most types of global problems.'
It appears that the world simply expects more from
the UN as it prepares to celebrate a milestone that its prede-
cessor, the League of Nations,4 did not achieve. New standards
are being used to evaluate the organization. No longer can the
UN's role in reducing tensions between East and West be a
credible response to those who question its continued value
and efficacy.'
Peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted
by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter
Agenda for Peace].
3. Even the United States Congress,. which on occasion has provided some of
the more virulent anti-UN rhetoric, now routinely calls for the United States to
get UN support on issues ranging from Korea's development of nuclear weapons to
intervention in Haiti and Rwanda.
4. The League of Nations was established at the end of the First World War
by the Treaty of Versailles which came into force on January 10, 1920. BYRON
DEXTER, THE YEARS OF OPPORTUNITY: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920-1926, at 67
(1967). The League was in existence until 1946 when it was dissolved and its
property and assets were transferred to the UN. KtMIKO MATSUURA ET AL., CHRO-
NOLOGY AND FACT BOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1942-1991, at 5 (1992). Even
though the League Covenant was formulated around a draft by the Wilson admin-
istration, the U.S. Senate rejected it and the United States never became a mem-
ber of the organization. See HILDERBRAND, supra note 1; MOYNIHAN, supra note 1.
For more on the League, see ROBERT GOLDSMITH, A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE
(1917); H. WILSON HARRIS, WHAT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS (1925); H. ARNOLD
NICHOLSON, PEACEMAKING 1919 (1933); 5 WOODROW WILSON, Address of January
8, 1918, in WAR AND PEACE: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC
PAPERS, (1917-1924), at 161 (Ray S. Baker & William E. Dodd eds., 1925).
5. Early Clinton administration policies suggesting increased support for the
UN have come under considerable criticism. Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, for
example, accused the administration of "acquiescence in UN inaction in Bosnia-
Herzegovina . . . " and urged the Senate not to "put false hope and high expecta-
tions into flawed institutions, especially the United Nations." William Claiborne,
Dole Decries U.S. Bosnia Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1993, at A25.
Columnist George Will, on the other hand, decried U.S. collaboration with
the UN in Somalia as signaling the Clinton administration's "interventionist for-
eign policy in the name of multilateralism." George F. Will, Surrendering the Stars
and Stripes, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at A27. Will lamented the implication
that "America is nothing special, just another nation, and it should act only in
concert with coalitions." Id. He predicts the American public "will not forgive sub-
ordinating U.S. policy to people who pledge allegiance to the United Nations' pale
blue flag." Id. Senator Robert Byrd captured anti-UN sentiments in the United
States when he asserted in the Senate that "I do not see in the front of this
chamber the U.N. flag. I have never saluted the U.N. flag. I salute Old Glory, the
American flag." Elaine Sciolino, The U.N.'s Glow is Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
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While UN supporters can point with considerable satisfac-
tion to its many accomplishments-the most commendable of
which must be its role in avoiding another world
war'-detractors have criticized its role, or lack thereof, in
many post-Cold War crises. The end of the Cold War has enliv-
ened the debate about the proper role and contributions of the
UN.
The interplay of these additional demands and new stan-
dards has contributed to a serious and growing negative public
perception problem for the UN.7 In Bosnia and Somalia, UN
representatives and peace-keepers have been openly ridiculed
and attacked.8 In Angola and Cambodia, rebel forces chal-
lenged UN authority, and the UN-supervised elections failed to
resolve either conflict. In Haiti and Iraq, discredited leaders
have scorned and resisted UN demands and sanctions, leaving
the victims of state-directed abuses to criticize the organization
for insufficient enforcement. The general picture of the UN
that emerges is that even as more people want the UN to do
more, others have become more critical of the organization's
shortcomings.9
1993, at Al, A10.
6. The UN Charter begins with the following declaration: "WAe the Peoples of
the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . have
resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims . . . ." U.N. CHARTER
pmbl. The maintenance of peace and the protection of human rights are considered
the two main purposes of the UN. Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention:
A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 236 (J.N. Moore ed., 1974).
7. "After a brief post-cold war honeymoon, the United Nations is once again
suffering from the inability to enforce its decision in critical situations, this time
without the excuse of the obstacles created by the Cold War." Paul Lewis, Reluc-
tant Peacekeepers: Many U.N. Members Reconsider Role in Conflicts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1993, at A22 (statement by Sir Brian Urquarht, former UN Under Secre-
tary-General in Charge of Peacekeeping).
8. See, e.g., Hella Pick, Ten Days at the Sharp End, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Jan. 9, 1993, at 10; Carol J. Williams, The Shadow of a Shield; Amid Deepening
Violence, U.N. Forces in Bosnia Have Come to Symbolize Not Hope But Impotence
to Those They've Come to Help, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1993, (Magazine), at 16.
9. While the UN probably enjoys a higher profile today than ever, its most
important peacemaking missions are threatened with collapse in trouble spots as
varied as Angola, El Salvador, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, raising the
possibility of a damaging reversal to its influence. Despite these setbacks, demand
for the organization's services remains so strong that Secretary-General Boutros-
Boutros Ghali fears it may be unable to cope with the strains. Paul Lewis, Peace-
keeper to Peacemaker: U.N. Confronting New Roles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at
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The UN has begun to respond to these criticisms and the
expectations underlying them. Its response has gone beyond an
examination of its field operations to include a reexamination
of its structure and basic principles. ° Undoubtedly, the man-
ner in which the organization responds to criticisms and sug-
gested reforms will determine to a major extent whether it
survives and prospers into the next century and beyond, or
suffers a fate similar to the League of Nations."
This Article examines the state of the UN as it prepares to
celebrate its fiftieth anniversary, and recommends directions
for its future. The Article focuses on the UN's work in support
of international peace and security; it is the UN's work in this
area that now attracts most of the attention and criticism. 2
Part II of this Article begins with a review of the organization's
performance in three major post-Cold War conflicts: the con-
flicts in the Persian Gulf (Iraq-Kuwait), the Balkans (Yugosla-
via), and the Horn of Africa (Somalia). These conflicts have
severely tested the structure, capacity and meaning of the UN.
These case studies best highlight the weaknesses in the
organization's structure, and in its traditional orientation and
performance.
Following this review, Part III examines the Agenda for
Peace report, in which the UN administration attempted to
respond to many of the criticisms of the organization in the
post-Cold War period. This section identifies the inadequacies
Al; see also Sciolino, supra note 5.
10. See Agenda for Peace, supra note 2. See generally Anthony C. Arend, The
United Nations and the New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 491 (1993); John H.
Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81
GEO. L.J. 535 (1993); Paul H. Nitze, Foreword; International Security in a New
World, 81 GEo. L.J. 481 (1993); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on U.N.
Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903 (1992); Oscar Schachter, United Nations
Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1991).
11. Historians tend to place the blame for the League's collapse on the failure
of the great powers, and particularly the United States, to cooperate in the arena
of international peace. PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS
334 (1987); HERBERT F. MARGULIES, THE MILD RESERVATIONISTS AND THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS CONTROVERSY IN THE SENATE 271-73 (1989); F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920-1946, at 278-85 (1986); see also MOYNIHAN, supra note
1, at 55-68.
12. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 10; Burns H. Weston, Security Council
Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM.
J. INTL L. 516 (1991). See generally HIDEMI SUGANAAII, THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY
AND WORLD ORDER PROPOSALS (1989).
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in the Agenda for Peace approach and argues that the time has
come to revisit and reconsider more visionary proposals for
reinvigorating and reinventing the UN. 3
Part IV discusses the need for fundamental changes in the
UN, focusing on the way such changes would affect the three
most important organs of the organization: the General Assem-
bly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).4 Changes in the structure, orientation and operation of
these key organs will enable the UN as an institution to re-
spond better to the increased expectations and growing de-
mand for its services.
In conclusion, this Article argues that these changes are
essential not only to achieve the expressed aims of the organi-
zation, but also to revitalize faith in a common human desire
for peace, security, justice, and social progress. If the UN is to
represent more than the temporary compromises of the world's
most powerful nations, it must transcend its present structure
and narrow vision.
II. LESSONS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, THE BALKANS AND THE
HORN OF AFRICA
The overriding concern of the founders of the UN was to
save "succeeding generations from the scourge of war .... "'
This objective should still qualify as the primary focus of the
13. Over one hundred years before the founding of the United Nations, Alfred
Lord Tennyson captured the essence of the vision offered here as the alternative:
For I dipt into the future, far as the human ey6 could see,
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a ghastly dew
From the nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue;
Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,
With the standards of the peoples plunging thro' the thunderstorm;
Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.
There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.
2 ALFRED TENNYSON, Locksley Hall, in THE POEMS OF TENNYSON 118, 121
(Longman House 1987) (1842).
14. The other primary organs, the Economic and Social Council, the Trustee-
ship Council, and the Secretariat are not examined in this paper. See U.N. CHAR-
TER arts. 61-72, 86-91, 97-101.
15. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
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organization. And with regard to it, the UN has succeeded
insofar as the world has been spared a global conflagration-a
World War III between East and West. However, since the
creation of the UN, the world has witnessed more than one
hundred major conflicts short of global war. Over forty million
people have lost their lives16 and material losses are beyond
quantification. 7 The end of the Cold War has not, unfortu-
nately, led to a reduction in these conflicts. Indeed, it may
have actually revived some of them. It is increasingly apparent
that the UN system, as it is presently structured and oriented,
is inadequate to deal with the drastic changes in the global
community that may now be fueling these conflicts. The follow-
ing case studies will illustrate basic weaknesses in the UN
system and serve as practical and dramatic reminders of the
necessity for urgent fundamental reform.
A. The UN in the Persian Gulf The Iraq-Kuwait Dispute and
the Gulf War.
The Iraq-Kuwait conflict began as a typical territorial
dispute between two neighboring sovereign states and then
widened to become the largest multinational military conflict
involving the UN as a party since the Korean War." After an
enormous expenditure of scarce global resources, the dispute
persists today, unresolved and perhaps much more complicated
and threatening to international peace and security. 9 As an
16. This is the estimate for the total number of persons killed in the 125
wars since 1945. Let Them Eat Guns, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1991, at 61.
17. See Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 4.
18. "The Cold War effectively stunted the use of military enforcement by the
Security Council, with the one main exception of the UN-authorized operation in
Korea in 1950. To fill the vacuum left in the powers of the UN, peacekeeping
gradually emerged." N.D. WI-TE, KEEPING THE PEACE 199 (1993). Since its foun-
ding, the UN has authorized about 25 peacekeeping and observer missions, whose
mandate should be properly distinguished from those of the UN forces that en-
gaged in combat in Korea and Iraq. An exception was the UN force in Congo from
1960 to 1964, which went beyond traditional peacekeeping activities into peace-
making. This force, however, constituted only a fraction of the UN-authorized forc-
es engaged in the Gulf War. Id. at 183-88, 206-08.
19. Despite the overwhelming Allied victory, political and military conditions
in the Gulf remain volatile, as evidenced by continued Iraqi repression of its
Kurdish and Shiite populations, and occasional military confrontations between
Iraqi and Kuwaiti border forces. See Chris Hedges, In a Remote Southern Marsh,
Iraq is Strangling the Shiites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at Al; Iraq in Mass
Arrests of Kurds, Opposition Group Says, REUTERS, Oct. 5, 1993, available in
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example of how the UN manages international conflicts in the
post-Cold War era, the Iraq-Kuwait conflict has been a near
total disaster for the UN. The UN can benefit, however, from a
thorough examination of its role in the conflict."
On August 2, 1990, more than forty-five years after the
founding of the UN, Iraq, a UN member, invaded and proceed-
ed to annex Kuwait, another member nation, in violation of the
core principles of the UN and the appeals of the vast majority
of its members."'
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Library Report Files; Iraqis Shoot at Border Post
with Heavy Fire, Kuwait Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 29, 1993, at A13; Kuwait
Reports Another Clash on Iraq Border, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1993, at 6N; Carlyle
Murphy, Buffeted by Hardships in Southern Iraq, 3000 Shiites Flee to Iran, WASH.
POST, July 24, 1993, at A18; Saddam Foes Say Hundreds Killed in Gas Attack,
REUTERS, Oct. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Library Report
Files; Gareth Smyth, Kurds Fear Saddam's Ire: Level of Allied Protection Seems
Unclear, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at 3.
20. The 1992 Summit of the Heads of State invited the Secretary-General to
submit his suggestions regarding possible reforms to the organization. U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 18, 47, 63, 72, 119, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (prov. ed.
1992), cited in Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and
the Legal Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773 n.2 (1993). These suggestions became the
Agenda for Peace proposals, supra, note 2.
21. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. R.W. Apple, Jr., Invading Iraqis
Seize Kuwait and Its Oil: U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges United Action, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1990, at Al. Later that same day, the Security Council adopted Resolution
660 which condemned the invasion and demanded that Iraq immediately withdraw
its military forces from Kuwait. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg.
at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). The Resolution further called upon the parties
to "begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences"
and left open the possibility that the Council would "consider further steps to
ensure compliance" with the terms of the Resolution. Id.
All five permanent members voted in the affirmative, and the Resolution
was adopted by a vote of 14-0 with only Yemen abstaining. However, it is note-
worthy that the Resolution nowhere condemns Iraq's conduct as a violation of
international law, let alone as contrary to any specific international agreement, to
say nothing of the UN Charter, Article 2, %% 3 and 4. The Resolution speaks
merely of a "breach of international peace and security" Id.
After four days, during which Iraq did not indicate its willingness to com-
ply, the Council, on August 6, adopted Resolution 661. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990). Again, Article 2, 4
was not invoked, although this time the Council did invoke Article 51 in support
of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence . . . ." Id. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 51. Broadly proclaiming its authority under Chapter VII, the Council
imposed an embargo on all Iraqi and Kuwaiti imports and exports, but with the
proviso that member states should not be prohibited from providing "assistance to
the legitimate government of Kuwait . . . ." S.C. Res. 661, supra, at 20.
Furthermore, all states were directed to freeze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets
within their territories other than those specifically earmarked for humanitarian
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purposes. Resolution 661 was adopted with the required "concurring votes" of the
five permanent members as per Article 27 and by a total of 13 yea votes and zero
nays, Cuba and Yemen abstaining. S.C. Res. 661, supra, at 20; see U.N. CHARTER
art. 27.
Following the purported annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, the Council adopted
Resolution 662 on August 9, declaring such annexation null and void and calling
upon all states, members and non-members of the UN alike, to deny the validity
of Iraq's pronouncement of annexation and "to refrain from any action or dealing
that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation." S.C. Res.
662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990). This
Resolution was adopted unanimously. It is noteworthy that the first U.S. troops
had already been sent to Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990, without any UN in-
volvement whatsoever. UN approval was sought after the fact. See S.C. Res. 665,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990) (passed on
August 25).
In response to Iraq's harassment of international diplomatic personnel and
other third party nationals located within Iraq and Kuwait, the Council, on August
18, adopted Resolution 664 demanding that Iraq allow all third-party nationals
safe conduct and to permit the consulates of those third party states access to
their nationals within Kuwaiti or Iraqi territory. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2937th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990). This Resolution was also
passed unanimously. Id.
One week later the Council adopted Resolution 665 authorizing Kuwait's al-
lies to impose a blockade on Kuwait and Iraq in order to facilitate the implemen-
tation of Resolution 661. See S.C. Res. 665, supra. This Resolution further request-
ed "States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above para-
graphs of.. . [this] Resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military
Staff Committee . . . ." This language is the only such reference in any of the
Iraq Resolutions, and is in fact a response to a Russian proposal that such a
Committee should wield the authority for any military action against Iraq. Reso-
lution 665 was adopted by a vote of 13-0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining.
On September 13, 1990, the Council adopted Resolution 666 providing for
the supply of emergency foodstuffs to Iraqis and Kuwaitis, especially children,
pregnant women, and the sick and elderly, through the offices of the Secretary-
General in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. S.C.
Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990).
In Resolution 667, passed on September 16, the Council reiterated its demands
that Iraq release all detained third-party nationals, that it comply with the previ-
ous Resolutions, and that it take steps to ensure the safety of diplomatic and con-
sular personnel. S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg. at 23, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/667 (1990). The Council therein decided "to consult urgently to take
further concrete measures as soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter,
in response to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the Secu-
rity Council and of international law." Id. at 24.
Resolution 669 of September 24 entrusted to a Committee established under
Resolution 661 the examination of the "increasing number of requests for assis-
tance" being made pursuant to Article 50 of the UN Charter. S.C. Res. 669, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2942nd mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 (1990). Article 50
entitles aid to third parties suffering special economic hardships resulting from
previous preventive or enforcement Security Council measures directed at a party
or parties to a given dispute. U.N. CHARTER art. 50. Twenty-one member states
had claimed hardships as a result of the economic sanctions levied against Iraq.
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As Iraq trampled the most basic concern of the UN-inter-
national peace and security-most of the members of the world
body watched helplessly. When the UN was finally moved to
action, its response, as expected, depended on the raw military
power of the global community rather than on the rule of law.
The response also confirmed the organization's dependence on
the will of its most powerful member-not the collective
will-for action.22 The Gulf War was a glorious moment only
for those comfortable with a vision of the United States as the
imperial center dispatching legions, supplemented by volun-
teers from the provinces, to quell rebellions in remote corners
of the empire.23
The most distressing lesson from the UN response is that
the leaders of Iraq, who plotted and pursued gross violations of
The hardships complained of were mainly oil shortages, stoppages of payments for
exports to Iraq and Kuwait and the interruption of financial remittances from
migrant workers located in Kuwait. This Resolution was adopted unanimously.
S.C. Res. 669, supra.
The following day the Council, by a vote of 14-1 with Cuba voting nay,
adopted Resolution 670. S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg. at 24,
SIRES/670 (1990). It called for "all States to carry out their obligations to ensure
strict and complete compliance with Resolution 661" and, affirming that the Reso-
lution applied "to all means of transport, including aircraft," it decided that all
States were henceforth to "deny permission to any aircraft to take -ff from their
territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other
than food in humanitarian circumstances . . . ." Id. at 25. The Resolution further
decided that all states were to deny overflight permission "to any aircraft destined
to land in Iraq or Kuwait" unless previously certified by the UN as a humanitar-
ian mission or unless such aircraft first landed in a state other than Iraq or Ku-
wait. This was to permit inspection to determine compliance with Resolution 661.
Id. This Resolution further authorized the detention by all states in their ports of
ships of Iraqi registry determined to be in use in violation of Resolution 661. Id.
Finally, Resolution 670 reaffirmed Iraq's status as a High Contracting Party to the
Fourth Geneva Convention, so that Iraq was "bound to comply fully with all its
terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave
breaches committed by it . . . ." Id.
22. "[A] number of senators and representatives . . . expressed anxiety about
the failure of most other countries to promise troops so far for the joint military
effort." R.W. Apple, Jr., U.S. May Send Saudis a Force of 50,000; Iraq Proclaims
Kuwait's Annexation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at Al; see also Elaine Sciolino,
Washington Talk: Again, a U.S. Surprise Leaves Nations Upset, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1990, at A20.
23. For an argument that the United States should take the initiative in
forming new international security mechanisms rather than continue its role as
the world's policeman, see David Boren, The World Needs an Army on Call, N.Y.
TMES, Aug. 26, 1992, at A21 (Boren is the chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee); see also Alan K. Henrikson, How Can the Vision of a "New World
Order" Be Realized?, 16 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 63 (1992).
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international law and UN principles, are still very much in
power in Iraq, and have yet to be held personally accountable
for their actions and the resulting consequences.24 Now, more
than three years after the Iraqi invasion, the people of the
region still have not found peace and security; and respect for
the rule of law and the integrity of the national borders is still
dubious.25
To fully appreciate the extent of the UN's failures in this
conflict, and to underscore the necessity for fundamental
changes to the UN's structure and orientation, it is necessary
to analyze three aspects of the conflict: (1) how the UN pacific
dispute settlement machinery failed to resolve the Iraq-Kuwait
dispute prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, (2) how the UN
responded to the invasion, and (3) how the UN managed the
aftermath of the Gulf War.
1. Failures of the UN Pacific Dispute Settlement Machinery
Even though Iraq recognized the Kuwaiti state in 1963,2"
various Iraqi regimes had subjected Kuwait to claims against
its integrity and sovereignty for decades.2 Despite negotia-
24. See discussion infra part IIA.1 on UN capacity for peaceful settlement of
disputes. See generally Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf
War, 45 STAN. L. REV. 425 (1993).
25. Indeed, Iraq has rejected the new UN-drawn border with Kuwait and
continues to refer to Kuwait as its nineteenth province. William Maclean, Kuwaitis
Insecure Despite Border Demarcation, REUTERS, May 23, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuters Library Report.
26. It is somewhat ironic that it was a Ba'athist regime-the ideological fore-
runner of the Hussein regime-in Iraq that eventually recognized Kuwait.
Iraqi exiles allege Kuwait bankrolled the coup that overthrew
[Iraqi leader] Qassim and paid the Ba'athists £30 million pounds, and
that in exchange the Ba'ath renounced Iraqi claims.
It is also alleged that Kuwait secretly lent the new Ba'ath regime
a further $85 million when it formally acknowledged its neighbor's sover-
eignty and independence. Kuwaiti officials deny both allegations. Baghdad
says its 1963 agreement recognizing Kuwait's independence was invalid
because it was never placed before the [sic] Iraq's Revolutionary Council.
Jason Becker, Nation Was Al-Sabah Family Business, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Feb. 26, 1991, at 4.
27. Iraq, for example, objected, with Soviet support, when Kuwait was granted
independence by the British in 1961. Six days after Kuwait gained independence
Iraqi Prime Minister, General Kassem (or Qassim) laid claim to all of Kuwait. The
claim was not recognized by the international community as valid and in 1963,
after the overthrow of General Kassem and the accession of President Aref, Iraq
relinquished its claim and recognized Kuwait as a sovereign state. BORDER AND
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tions going back to the early part of this century, Iraq stead-
fastly refused to ratify any border agreement between the two
countries." Neither Iraq nor Kuwait, however, brought their
disputes before any organ of the UN.
When Iraq sent its forces into Kuwait on August 2, 1990,
it is reasonable to suppose that the Saddam Hussein regime
had reached two conclusions: first, that the expected benefits
from invading and annexing Kuwait would outweigh the ex-
pected international costs of the actions; second, that there was
no more effective way other than the use of force to satisfy
Iraq's claims against Kuwait. While the American-led UN
response confirmed the error of the former conclusion, the
latter has yet to be rebutted.
The UN Charter imposes an obligation on all members to
settle their international disputes by peaceful means29 and
the Security Council is assigned the dominant role in ensuring
compliance with this obligation." Article 33 of the UN Char-
ter calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes which are likely
"to endanger the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity." The Article explicitly encourages negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, judicial settlement and other such peaceful dispute
resolution methods. Article 34 of the UN Charter gives the
Security Council the power to investigate, on its own initiative,
any such disputes or any situation which could give rise to
such disputes. Article 35 encourages all members-including
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 244-45 (Alan J. Day ed., 2d ed. 1987).
28. From 1963 through 1973 Iraq claimed two islands owned by Kuwait,
namely Warba and Bubiyan. The possession of these islands, situated just south of
the Iraq-Kuwait border in the northeast Persian Gulf, would give improved access
to the Gulf. Iraq and Kuwait began a series of negotiations in 1973 to settle the
border question but agreement on the demarcation of their common border was
not reached, and Iraq revived its claim to Warba and Bubiyan in 1981. Id.
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, $ 3 ("All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and securi-
ty, and justice, are not endangered."); id. % 4 ("All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state. .. ").
30. The UN Charter Article 24, 1 confers upon the Security Council "pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," and
authorizes the Council in advance to act on behalf of the member states in this
area. Id. art. 24, 1. The UN Charter Article 24, 2, however, qualifies the
powers of the Security Council in carrying out its duties in this area by requiring
it "[to] act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."
Id. [ 2.
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those not immediately affected-to bring these disputes to the
attention of the Security Council.
One basic weakness in the UN's dispute settlement
procedure is that it affords the Security Council no practical
means to compel orderly resolution of disputes that could en-
danger international peace but which have not yet matured
into actual "threats to the peace."3 This weakness derives
more from traditional interpretation and practice than from an
inherent flaw in the UN Charter. Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter, and in particular Article 39, could be construed liberally to
allow the Security Council the right to treat practically any
dispute as a threat to the peace.32 Under this interpretation 'of
Article 39, the Security Council always has the power to "de-
cide what measures shall be taken-in accordance with Arti-
cles 41 and 42- to maintain or restore international peace and
security."33 However, this broad interpretation of Article 39 is
undercut by Chapter VI of the Charter, which presupposes
that there are some disputes that do not rise to the level of
threats to international peace and security. 4
Under the guidelines for the pacific settlement of disputes
outlined in Chapter VI, the Security Council can "call upon"
parties to pursue peaceful solutions or "recommend such terms
of settlement as it may consider appropriate."3 While the Se-
curity Council's powers under Chapter VII are more extensive
than its Chapter VI powers, the Chapter VII powers must
31. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38.
32. As professors McDougal and Reisman saw it, "the framers . . . deliberately
conferred upon the Security Council, in the provisions of Chapter VII, a very
broad competence" to make such determinations and to decide upon the steps
necessary to bring about international peace and security. McDougal and Reisman,
Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AAM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1968).
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
34. See id. art. 33, % 1 ("The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all seek a solution by [various peaceful means] . . . of their own choice");
id. art. 34 ("The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute . ").
35. See id. arts. 33-38. Under Article 36, for example, the Security Council
can only recommend, not mandate, appropriate ways of resolving such disputes. Id.
art. 36. Additionally, under UN Charter Article 37, %1 2, the Security Council again
can take action under Article 36 or "recommend such terms of settlement as it
may consider appropriate." Id. art. 37, 2. Note that the Secretary-General also
"may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opin-
ion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." Id. art. 99.
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properly be seen as limited by the traditional interpretation of
"threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggres-
sion." There is therefore, in essence, a "power gap" between the
Security Council acting in a Chapter VI, "pacific peaceful set-
tlement of disputes" mode, and its acting in a Chapter VII
"acts of aggression" mode. Thus, Security Council actions
aimed at resolving international disputes such as Iraq-Kuwait
are credible only to the degree that it acts pursuant to Chapter
VII.36
The judicial organ of the UN also lacked the means to in-
tervene in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute because of the deliberately
constricted role that it has been given in international conflict
resolution. In addition to the primary role assigned to the
Security Council for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, the UN provides a complementary role for the Inter-
national Court of Justice-the principal judicial organ of the
UN." Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice states that the main function of the court is "to decide
in accordance with international law such disputes as are sub-
mitted to it. . . ."' Generally, the ICJ can consider disputes
only if the parties accept its jurisdiction and submit the dis-
putes to it for resolution.39 Thus, the Court, at present, is in
no position to assist with the resolution of many disputes
which actually threaten or possess the potential to threaten
36. This lack of credibility for Security Council actions under Chapter VI as
opposed to actions under Chapter VII is the direct result of delegates to the San
Francisco conference rejecting language in a draft of the Chapter that left open
the possibility that the Security Council would have the power to impose a settle-
ment upon parties where a failure to reach a settlement could be interpreted as a
threat to the peace. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 257-59. Indeed, language
linking the Security Council's actions in the two areas-Chapter VI and Chapter
VII-was deleted, in effect, weakening the Council's powers under Chapter VI.
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 258.
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 92; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
38. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38.
39. "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer
to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations
or in treaties and conventions in force." Id. art. 36, 1. Consent may be made by
declaration in advance of any disputes. Id. % 2. At the San Francisco Conference,
the members unanimously recommended that all members make such declarations
recognizing ICJ jurisdiction. Many members did so, but with such extensive res-
ervations as to render the effect nugatory. The United States, for example, took a
reservation excluding any dispute determined by the United States to be "essen-
tially within its domestic jurisdiction." GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 549-52.
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international peace. In any case, the court has never been
provided with the means to compel compliance with its deci-
sions.4 ° Enforcement was left to the discretion of the Security
Council.4
The failure of the UN machinery for the pacific settlement
of disputes contributed to the Iraqi invasion, the Gulf War, and
the continuation of instability in the region. Unfortunately, the
UN's conduct during the Gulf War and its aftermath have
provided no useful new guidelines for settling disputes such as
the one between Iraq and Kuwait in a peaceful manner.
2. The UN Response to the Iraqi Invasion
Iraq's resort to invasion to settle its claims against Kuwait
highlighted the weaknesses in the UN's peaceful dispute settle-
ment machinery. The UN response to the invasion, however,
underlined the fundamental weaknesses of the whole UN
structure and confirmed the extent to which the organization is
beholden to the will and resources of the sole surviving super-
power." The Security Council did not invoke Chapter VII un-
40. This problem has not escaped the notice of the current Secretary-General.
In his Agenda for Peace, he recommends that all members accept "general juris-
diction" without reservation per Article 36, % 3, or, in the alternative, at least
binding jurisdiction of the court in explicit categories of disputes. Agenda for
Peace, supra note 2, at 11. In the Corfu Channel case, for the only time in the
organization's history, the Security Council made a recommendation that the par-
ties submit their dispute immediately to the ICJ. The United Kingdom argued
that this recommendation constituted grounds to compel jurisdiction, but seven of
the judges found this conclusion "improper." Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.),
1947-1948 I.C.J. 31-32 (Mar. 25, 1948), cited in GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at
282.
41. The UN Charter, Article 94 provides: "Each Member of the United Na-
tions undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice
in any case to which it is a party." U.N. CHARTER art. 94, 9% 1. Additionally, un-
der Article 94, J 2, the Security Council is granted the power to enforce the
Court's judgment provided one of the parties to a case so requests. Id. T 2. This
power is purely optional. The Security Council arguably could also invoke its
Chapter VII powers and enforce an ICJ judgment that was being ignored by the
losing state, if the Council determines that such non-compliance poses a threat to
international peace and security. See id. arts. 39-51.
42. The United States was able to get UN imprimatur for the war against
Iraq without ceding control of the conduct of the war or putting U.S. troops under
UN command. Security Council Resolution 678 vaguely authorized the use of "all
necessary means" to uphold and implement UN Security Council decisions, and
transferred this authority to others. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d
mtg. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. SIRES/678 (1990). While this action does not appear to
be consistent with much of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it has been justified
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til after the Iraqi invasion. Even this may never have occurred
had the United States not convinced the other members of the
Council that it was determined to escalate the conflict and
take responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Council's
decisions in this case.43 The fact that the Council acted in this
instance says little about the ability or potential of the Council
to encourage peaceful resolution of conflicts. Aspiring inter-
national rogues-following the example of Iraqi leaders-can
expect that the Council will act only if the interests of the
United States become sufficiently threatened and the United
States brings along or purchases the acquiescence of others on
the Council.
The UN's acquiescence in what was in essence an Ameri-
can war against Iraq raises serious concerns."4 The organi-
under Article 51 ("the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence"). U.N.
CHARTER art. 51. This Resolution, however, was adopted arguably in violation of
Article 27, 3 of the Charter, which requires that non-procedural decisions of the
Council "shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the con-
curring votes of the permanent members . . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 27, % 3. Chi-
na's abstention on Resolution 678 raised questions about the validity of the sub-
stantive provisions of the Resolution. S.C. Res. 678, supra, at 28. Apparently, how-
ever, UN practice does not consider a voluntary abstention a veto. See GOODRICH
ET AL., supra note 1, at 230-31. Security Council Resolution 678 was adopted by a
vote of 12-2-1, Cuba and Yemen voting nay and China abstaining. Cuba and Ye-
men objected on the ground that the Council had not yet determined the nonmili-
tary sanctions to be inadequate. S.C. Res. 678, supra, at 28. Such a determination
is, under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, a prerequisite to the use of force.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 41, 42.
43. The Bush administration took total leadership over the efforts to gain
Iraqi withdrawal, from calling the Security Council into session just hours after
the Iraqi invasion, to, a few days later, sending tens of thousands of American
troops to Saudi Arabia. See Elaine Sciolino, Putting Teeth in an Embargo: How
U.S. Convinced the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at Al; Excerpts from Presi-
dent Bush's Address from the Oval Office, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at A15.
44. On January 25, 1991, the Washington Post, relying on Department of De-
fense announcements, reckoned the total number of United States troops deployed
in the Gulf to be 475,000. James Schwartz, Footing the Bill for Desert Storm,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1991, at A28. On January 17, 1991, the Financial Times
counted a total of 35,000 British troops. David White, One Million Troops . ..
Face to Face Across the Kuwaiti Border, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at 5. The Dai-
ly Telegraph reported on January 11, 1991 that France had committed a total of
16,000 troops, that Egypt had sent 35,000 troops, Syria 19,000, and that Canada,
Italy, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Honduras and Nigeria had each contributed
small contingents to the war. Poland sent one hospital ship and Czechoslovakia a
chemical decontamination unit. Australia and Argentina sent a few frigates. Peter
Almond, How the Forces Compare: Two Huge Armies Face Each Other in the Gulf,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 1991, at 17, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
TELEGR. File. Resolution 678, which authorized the war, was apparently drafted
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zation's credibility as a true world body has been severely
damaged by the perception that it was manipulated and then
discarded by the United States.45 The haste with which the
Security Council went from imposing economic sanctions begin-
ning in early August to authorizing force to expel Iraq in late
November 199046 has led to strong criticism of the lack of con-
in large measure by the United States Department of State's Office of the Legal
Advisor. See Weston, supra note 12, at 519.
Weston argues that the Security Council's Article 42 authority does not ex
proprio vigore confer on that body the power to cede unilateral jurisdiction to any
single member state, but rather conditions any use of force on the pre-existence of
a "special agreement or agreements . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security," pursuant to Article 43. See U.N. CHARTER art.
42. Note that no reference to either of these all-important Charter Articles is
found in the text of Resolution 678. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 42. An exam-
ination of Article 106 makes clear the enabling relationship between such special
Article 43 agreements and the Council's exercise of Article 42 enforcement powers..
See U.N. CHARTER art. 106. The drafters of the Charter foresaw emergencies not
covered by Article 43 arrangements, and so required, under Article 106, that the
five permanent members consult with one another and on occasion with other
members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the
organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.
Though arguably the incorporation by reference of Resolution 661 affords
Resolution 678 legitimacy via Article 51, any individual or collective self-defense
measures taken by a member state or states under Article 51 authority is by the
terms of that Article legitimate only "until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art.
51. More to the point, had the Council in adopting Resolution 678 truly relied on
the emergency Article 51 powers of members to defend themselves, it could easily
have said so. Lastly, when one takes into account the fact that no dire emergency
existed on the day Resolution 678 was adopted, and in fact many weeks elapsed
between adoption on November 29, 1990 and the allied invasion on January 17,
1991, reliance on Article 51 becomes all the more suspect.
45.
[T]here is not a little apprehension that the United Nations, financially
dependent upon the United States and stripped of the prior check and
balance of Cold War rivalry, has become a venue for imposing upon the
world a lex or pax americana, apprehension that the 'new world order' of
which President Bush speaks will in fact be a unipolar world of unbri-
dled American power ....
Weston, supra note 12, at 535.
46. Miller, supra note 20. Resolution 678, adopted by the Council on Novem-
ber 29, 1990, ostensibly pursuant to the Security Council's Chapter VII authority,
authorizes the following:
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq
on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements . . . [the previous resolu-
tions dealing with the conflict], to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area.
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sistency in the organization's procedures and standards for
action. The UN usually does not act with such dispatch either
in approving sanctions or in taking measures beyond sanc-
tions.4 ' The seeming impatience of the Council with the oper-
ation of sanctions in this instance has been defended rather
unconvincingly, on grounds that sanctions would not have
accomplished the goal of forcing Iraq out of Kuwait."
The United States ability to manipulate the UN could be
significantly limited by clear and credible standards for using
sanctions or force. To build greater institutional credibility and
reduce the likelihood of it being manipulated in the future, the
UN must develop standards which would lead to some consis-
tency in the application of sanctions and other measures be-
yond sanctions.49
Such standards would also have been valuable in ensuring
that the U.S.-led coalition used proportionate force in the at-
tacks on Iraq. International law requires some measure of
proportionality in the conduct of warfare." This concept, how-
S.C. Res. 678, supra note 42 (emphasis added).
47. For example, in the 1948 Arab-Israeli dispute, in the 1960 Congo rebel-
lion, during the 1963 embargo against South Africa, and in the dispute over the
secession of Southern Rhodesia, the Security Council acted to apply sanctions only
after the repeated urging of the General Assembly. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note
1, at 312-13.
48. In Congressional testimony on December 5, 1990, Director of the CIA,
William H. Webster, suggested that sanctions were generally working and that the
Iraqi military would begin losing combat readiness in about nine months. Michael
Wines, Standoff in the Gulf; Head of CIA Sees Iraqis Weakening in 3 to 9 Months,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1990, at Al. Many noted American analysts supported giving
sanctions more time, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Harold Brown, William J.
Crowe, James R. Schlesinger, Casper W. Weinberger, and Congressional Democrats
such as Sam Nunn, Carl Levin, and Robert Kerry. Schlesinger, a former Secretary
of Defense and Director of the CIA, said it was 'illogical" for the Bush Adminis-
tration to feel "impatience with [sanctions] because they will not have pro-
duced . . . results in six months' time."; see also William J. Crowe, Jr., On Jan.
15, We Must Stand United When the Balloon Goes Up, The Time for Second
Guessing Stops, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 1991, at 3C; Michael R.
Gordon, Cracking the Whip, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, (Magazine), at 16; Michael
Ross, Democrats Put Line in the Sand on Bush Policy, L.A. TIEs, Nov. 28, 1990,
at Al; R. Jeffery Smith, C!A Says Sanctions Would Need at Least a Year to Suc-
ceed, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1991, at A24; Eric Schmitt, Use Force in the Gulf, 14
Ex-Aides Urge, N.Y. TnIES, Dec. 18, 1990, at A9.
49. In his Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General recommends the revival of
the Military Staff Committee per Article 43, whose members, as professional sol-
diers representing UN members, would in each Chapter VII situation have the au-
thority to take decisions on the use of force by the organization. Agenda for Peace,
supra note 2, at 13.
50. Under the international law principle of proportionality, responsive uses of
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ever, is rather undeveloped and lacks definite criteria. It is to
be expected that a nation at war would place a lesser value on
the life or property of the enemy than on its own. A state that
finds its vital interests threatened may well see a justification
in using all means necessary to defend itself and to destroy its
enemy without due consideration to the concept of proportion-
ality. The UN, however, ought to be held to a higher standard.
It is not unreasonable to expect that in conducting or sanction-
ing a war, the UN should demonstrate greater concern about
enemy losses that are vastly disproportionate and, indeed,
about total global human cost, than was exhibited by the coali-
tion forces against Iraq.5  Looking just at the
disproportionately high casualties on the Iraqi side compared
to those incurred by the UN, one must indeed wonder about
the value the coalition placed on Iraqi life." This ought to be
force "must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking them." Kahn,
supra note 24, at 435 (quoting Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed
Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1637 (1984)). Also termed the principle of military
necessity, so-called customary international law provides that "a belligerent is
justified in applying the amount and kind of force necessary to achieve the com-
plete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment and with the least
expenditure of time, life, and resources." DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 5 (Ad-
am Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982).
51. The conduct of UN armed forces is governed by the humanitarian rules of
armed conflict according to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See 1971 Zagreb Resolu-
tion of the Institute of International Law on Conditions of Application of Humani-
tarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May
Be Engaged, 66 AM. J. INTL L. 465, 465-66 (1972).
The rules of warfare and respect for international legal principles apply a
fortiori to the organs of the organization charged with maintaining international
peace and security, an organization that presumably occupies the moral high
ground in military matters. The UN "should take the greatest care to ensure that
resolutions authorizing or ordering measures involving the use of force should be
clearly and firmly based on the provisions of the Charter, since the Organization
as well as members is bound by [the] principles [of the Charter] ... powers in
respect of the use of force should be used with circumspection." IAN BROWNLIE, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 336 (1963).
52. At a Riyadh press conference on February 27, 1991, General Norman
Schwarzkopf reported a "very, very, large number of dead in the [Iraqi forward]
units-a very, very large number of dead." John G. Heidenrich, The Gulf War:
How Many Iraqis Died?, 90 FOREIGN POLVY 108 (1993). Greenpeace estimated casu-
alty figures for Iraq of between 100,000 and 120,000 troops killed, and the Ameri-
can Defense Intelligence Agency reports released in the first week of June 1991
(in response to a Freedom Of Information Act request by the Natural Resources
Defense Council) gave Iraqis killed at 100,000 and wounded at 300,000, plus or
minus 50%. Numbers Still Hazy on Iraqi Casualties from Gulf War, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
When a U.S. Census Bureau demographer, Beth Osborne Daponte, released figures
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a particularly appropriate concern in this case given the ruth-
less control exercised by the tyrannical Iraqi regime over its
people, and the fact that most Iraqi soldiers are conscripts.
Another aspect of the proportionality issue is whether any
consideration was given to the view that, at some point, the
cost of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty by war might be unjusti-
fiably high in terms of total casualties and material destruc-
tion. Surely the UN has not ranked the defense of state sover-
eignty so high among its core principles that no evaluation of
casualties and material destruction is made when sovereignty
is violated."3 The issue here is not whether the UN must ever
acquiesce to such violations of international law but whether
the means chosen to rectify such violations, and the costs of
such rectification, should be more directly proportionate to the
interests at stake. How many more Iraqi dead or wounded, or,
for that matter, Coalition casualties, would the Coalition have
been prepared to tolerate in the interest of restoring the sover-
eignty of Kuwait? When nations fight amongst each other,
such a question might be deemed unrealistic. It should not be
out of place in deciding whether the UN should go to war. At a
minimum, the UN can be said to have missed a good opportu-
nity during the Persian Gulf conflict to teach some lessons
about the value of human life and the conduct of war in the
resolution of international disputes.
indicating that about 150,000 Iraqis, many of them women and children, had been
killed, including 40,000 troops, she was fired. She was subsequently reinstated
after the ACLU threatened to sue. A 1300-page April 1992 Pentagon report made
no mention at all of Iraqi casualties; the Melbourne Age of May 15, 1992, reported
that a draft chapter on Iraqi casualties had been deleted prior to publication.
Mark Baker, U.S. Buries the Human Cost of Victory over Iraq, THE AGE (Mel-
bourne), May 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. The
same Australian newspaper reported an Oxfam estimate that attributed more than
200,000 infant deaths to malnutrition and the unavailability of health services
following the war. Id. Up until the war began, American figures for Iraqi troops
totalled 550,000, and a House Armed Services Committee report immediately fol-
lowing the cessation of hostilities announced that aerial bombardment had reduced
the Iraqi army to about 183,000. These Congressional figures were based on inter-
views with 1000 combatants. Id.
53. "In the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces, the bom-
bardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is legitimate provided
there exists a reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently
important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger thus caused
to the civil population." 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, art. 24, § 4, 17 AM.
J. INT'L L. 245, 250 (Supp. 1923), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR,
supra note 50, at 126-27.
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3. The UN Management of the Gulf War's Aftermath: Peace,
Security, and Human Rights After the War
The conditions imposed by the UN on Iraq at the end of
the war appear to be extraordinarily onerous at first glance.54
In operation, however, the post-war sanctions imposed upon
Iraq by the UN show extraordinary solicitude to the Hussein
regime while imposing severe hardship on the Iraqi people.
These sanctions appear to affect Saddam Hussein only in
thwarting his megalomania. Although his enemies outside of
Iraq are to some significant extent safer, the same cannot be
said about the Iraqi people.
The people of Iraq, particularly the Kurds and Shiites,
have paid dearly for the way the war was concluded. The adop-
tion of Resolution 688"5 by the Security Council on April 5,
54. Security Council Resolution 686 demanded in effect that Iraq comply with
the following conditions: accept in principle its liability under international law for
any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states and their
nationals and corporations as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Ku-
wait by Iraq; immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to
be completed in the shortest possible period; cease hostile or provocative actions by
its forces against all member states, including missile attacks and flights of com-
bat aircraft; arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war
under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross
Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, and return the remains of any deceased per-
sonnel of the forces of Kuwait and the member states cooperating with Kuwait
pursuant to Resolution 678; and provide all information and assistance in iden-
tifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical and
biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of mem-
ber states cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 are present tempo-
rarily, and in the adjacent waters. See S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
2978th mtg. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991).
55. Resolution 688, in part, states the following:
The Security Council,
Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of
the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity,
Recalling the provisions Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter,
Gravely Concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian popula-
tion in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated
areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across inter-
national frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten interna-
tional peace and security in the region,
Deeply Disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering in-
volved, . . . .
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in
many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas,
the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in
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1991, was a belated recognition of the peril faced by the Kurds
and Shiites. The Resolution condemned the Iraqi force's brutal
treatment of the two groups by defining such treatment as a
threat to international security and requiring the Iraqi govern-
ment to allow the group access to international humanitarian
assistance." The UN, to its credit, rejected Iraq's attempt to
seek protection from the Resolution under Article 2 Section 7
the region;
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to
international peace and security in the region, immediately end this re-
pression, and in the same context expresses the hope that an open dia-
logue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all
Iraqi citizens are respected;
3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international hu-
manitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of
Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for their operations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian ef-
forts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a
further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian popula-
tion, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repres-
sion in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities;
5. Also requests the Secretary-General to use all the resources at
his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to
address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi
population ....
S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 31-32, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991).
56. The UN was forced to act when the repression of the Shiites and Kurdish
rebels, whose help the American-led coalition had enlisted in the war, became an
international cause celebre. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds-who as a tribe num-
ber 20 million and who range over the territories of five countries-were dying of
starvation and exposure. Iraq was refusing to permit deliveries of aid to the north-
ern, predominantly Kurdish provinces of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. No food
or fuel was being permitted to cross the Turkish border, and Iraq was accused of
bombarding UN relief convoys entering Iraq from Turkey.
Though the Security Council discussed the conflict between the Iraqi govern-
ment and the rebels in terms of its threat to international peace and security,
hence implicating its Chapter VII powers, and provided for a team of observers to
monitor Iraq's compliance with the new border terms and the demilitarized zone,
it did not resolve to establish protective areas for the rebels. Such enclaves were
not part of the terms of the cease-fire agreements. France had already tried and
failed to tie some guarantee of Kurdish freedom from persecution to the lifting of
UN trade embargoes. China and the Soviets, leery of the precedent such a condi-
tion might present in Tibet or the Baltics, respectively, along with Britain and the
United States, would not agree to any such intrusive measures.
On the other hand, the close relationship between the civil conflicts and the
international war that had just ended made it unseemly for the UN simply to
wash its hands of the affair. Clearly the international community had some re-
sponsibility to the embattled Iraqi rebels by dint of its earlier commitments in the
region.
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of the UN Charter which prohibits UN intervention in "mat-
ters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state."57
After the Second World War, the victorious forces occupied
Germany and Japan, and prosecuted surviving leaders of both
countries who were responsible for initiating and pursuing the
war." The people of both nations, and indeed the world, are
surely the better for this insistence upon personal accountabili-
ty for war crimes. The failure to remove the Hussein regime
from power, to try him and his advisers for war crimes and
crimes against the peace and to provide the people of Iraq with
a new opportunity for democratic governance must rank among
the major failures of the UN in the modern era. There is no
question that the cost of prosecuting the war all the way to
Baghdad would have been enormous and that assuredly, an
occupied Iraq would have been difficult to administer. Such
costs and difficulties, however, ought to be considered in light
of the resources that already had been expended by the Coali-
tion forces at the time of Iraq's surrender and the continuing
cost to the region and the world of an aggrieved renegade re-
gime bent on international mischief.59
As long as the Hussein regime remains in power the UN
will have ample evidence of the mistakes it made in dealing
with the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and its aftermath. The other
salutary step that the UN has yet to take is to recognize its
responsibility to the various minorities within Kuwait who
have been victimized by the UN-installed Kuwaiti regime and
Kuwaiti citizens bent on revenge. It should not be too much to
ask a government that owes its existence to the UN to live up
to some of the organization's basic principles.
57. There is precedent for the rejection of Iraq's claim. In the case of South
Africa's apartheid policies, the General Assembly has acted where it has found
violations of obligations under the Charter. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 71;
see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56; M.S. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC
JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1961).
58. See generally DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR (2d ed.
1991).
59. The United States, for example, has repeatedly accused Iraq of sheltering
and aiding terrorist organizations such as the Muhahedin-E Khalq (MEK), the Abu
Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu Abbas' Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), and the
May 15th Organizations' explosives expert Abu Ibrahim. Status Report on Iraqi
Non-Compliance with U.N. Resolutions, in DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Apr. 5, 1993, at
194.
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B. The United Nations in The Balkans: The Breakup of
Yugoslavia
The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via has presented the UN with a set of problems significantly
different from and far more complicated than those presented
by the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. In fact, the nature of
the Yugoslavian conflicts brought several of the UN's core
principles into conflict. In particular, the UN guarantee of non-
intervention in matters "essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state" ° came into direct conflict with the princi-
ple of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples.""' The
Yugoslavian conflicts were essentially about the rights of orga-
nized groups in a defined geographic area within a sovereign
UN member state to secede and become independent sovereign
states in their own right.
Unlike the relatively clear-cut problem of aggression by
one UN member state against another, the breakup of Yugo-
slavia has spawned a multitude of territorial disputes fueled
by centuries-old religious and cultural hatred, ethnic insecuri-
ty, and political miscalculations.62 The territorial claims are
60. The UN Charter states the following:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, % 7.
The Dumbarton Oaks proposal relating to this section used the word "sole-
ly" rather than the considerably looser "essentially" and the proposal was included
in the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" section. At the San Francisco conference, as
part of the effort to balance the broad powers and effectiveness of the United
Nations with the interests of sovereign nations, the proposal was placed in the
chapter on "Principles," and "essentially" was substituted for "solely." GOODRICH ET
AL., supra note 1, at 61-62.
61. U.N CHARTER art. 1, T 2.
62. Until its breakup, Yugoslavia-formally the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia--consisted of six republics (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two provinces (Kosovo and
Vojvodina), with a total population of 23.5 million (1990 estimate). FEDERAL RE-
SEARCH DiVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, YUGOSLAVIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, xv-xvi,
200-210 (Glenn E. Curtis, ed., 3d ed. 1992). Serbia was the largest of the political
divisions in terms of population and territory. Serbs were also the largest ethnic
group in Yugoslavia and "saw themselves as the basis of whatever Yugoslav feder-
ation existed because of their central role in 19th century liberation struggles and
in both world wars." Id. at 202. Slovenia was the most ethnically homogenous
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virtually impossible to resolve due to the presence of estab-
lished minority enclaves within many of the disputed areas.
The poorly defined principle of "self-determination of peo-
ples"-grandly endorsed by the UN Charter-has provided a
convenient rationale for the claims of all the parties.63 Com-
pared to Yugoslavia, the Iraq-Kuwait dispute was an issue in
black and white, at least from the moment Iraq moved to an-
nex Kuwait.' Yugoslavia was never black and white from an
republic and the richest per capita. Id. at 200. Croatia had a substantial Serbian
minority population within its borders and a history of anti-Serbian agitation. Id.
at 207. Bosnia-Hercegovina was a multiethnic republic, with a population of nearly
40% Muslim Slavs, living among Serbs and Croats. Id. at 210.
Beginning in late 1989 and escalating in 1990, Slovenia, and then Croatia,
began to limit the powers of the federal government in their affairs. Serbia was
opposed to these developments, and after negotiations for a looser relationship
among the republics failed in 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their indepen-
dence on June 25, 1991. War began shortly thereafter. Marc Weller, The Interna-
tional Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
86 AM. J. INTL L. 569 (1992) (discussing the history and politics of the conflict
and an examination of initial international response).
63. The origination of the principle of self-determination in modem interna-
tional usage is credited to Woodrow Wilson's campaign on behalf of the League of
Nations in the aftermath of the First World War. See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson, Ad-
dress Before the League to Enforce Peace (May 27, 1916), reprinted in 53 CONG.
REC. 8854 (daily ed. May 29, 1916) ("We believe these fundamental things: First,
that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall
live."); 54 CONG. REC. 1742 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1917) (statement of President Wil-
son Before the Senate), quoted in Claudia Saladin, Self-Determination, Minority
Rights, and Constitutional Accommodation: The Example of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 172, 180 n.47 (1991) ("No peace can last, or
ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments
derive all their just power from the consent of the governed, and that no right
anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they
were property.").
Wilson saw self-determination of peoples as essential to the stability and
reliability of the international community in its quest for world peace:
Only the free peoples of the world can join the League of Nations. No
nation is admitted to the league that cannot show that it has the institu-
tions which we call free. No autocratic government can come into its
membership, no government which is not controlled by the will and vote
of its people. Nobody is admitted except the self-governing nations, be-
cause it was the instinctive judgment of every man who sat around that
board that only a nation whose government was its servant and not its
master could be trusted to preserve the peace of the world.
WOODROW WILSON'S CASE FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 64 (Hamilton Foley ed.,
1923).
64. Professor Kahn suggests that had Iraq, instead of purporting to annex
Kuwait, merely seized those territories, namely the border strip containing the
Rumaila oil field and the offshore islands of Warba and Bubyiyan, which had been
the subject of a historic dispute, military action by the United States with its UN
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international law perspective. The UN Charter not only lacks
clear guidelines for dealing with the sort of hybrid civil-inter-
national conflicts that arose within the Yugoslav federation,
but several of its core principles provide conflicting directions
for addressing this type of dispute.
1. The Principle of Non-Intervention in Matters Essentially
Within the Domestic Jurisdiction of any State
Traditionally, the Security Council has been reluctant to
take action which would infringe on the domestic jurisdiction
of a sovereign member even when the rights of individuals and
groups within the sovereign state have been severely violat-
ed. 5 Although the Security Council could have justified early
intervention in the Yugoslavian conflicts by finding a threat to
peace, even though the conflicts were wholly contained within
the borders of the then sovereign state,66 this would have
been a bold departure from the organization's traditional prac-
tice of seeking and obtaining the consent of the recognized
state authorities before intervening in such disputes.67 The
seal of approval would have been "inconceivable." Kahn, supra note 24, at 429-30
(emphasis added).
65. This reluctance comes from the traditional interpretation of Article 2(7) of
the UN Charter. GOODRICH ET AL., supra, note 1, at 66-72. What has often ob-
scured the lack of action by the Council has been the extensive discussions that
have usually substituted for concrete actions, especially in the Cold War era.
66. All that is required to confer Security Council jurisdiction over a given
dispute is a "determination" of "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. But "a measure of discre-
tion is always involved in evaluating the facts of a situation, and the lack of any
definition or consensus concerning the meaning of the terms used in Article 39
leaves considerable room for subjective political judgment." GOODRICH ET AL., supra
note 1, at 293. Increasingly the argument is that in certain circumstances the
international community has not only the right but the duty to intervene, regard-
less of the principle of sovereignty. When the organization intervened to aid the
Kurds in Iraq, "the needs of a people took precedence over the wishes of a state."
Henrikson, supra note 23, at 70. Henrikson sees the developing "case law" of justi-
fiable international intervention in three areas: human rights violations, the stock-
piling of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental disasters or hazards. He
cites the incorporation, by reference, of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilians in Time of War of 1949 into the Iraq Security Council
Resolutions 670 and 674, and argues that the UN Declaration of Human Rights,
the international nuclear non-proliferation agreements and IAEA safeguards and
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of Environmental Principles should likewise sup-
port the "bold doctrine" of UN intervention in areas previously deemed "domestic."
Henrickson, supra note 23, at 71-73.
67. For instance, in the Congo conflict, UN intervention pursuant to its power
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Security Council's adherence to the principle of non-interven-
tion in sovereign affairs was a major barrier to timely UN
intervention in Yugoslavia. As noted earlier, in the Iraq case,
the UN was able to transcend or finesse this doctrinal hurdle
when it passed Resolution 688.8 In the Yugoslavia case, the
UN was faced with the desires of several ethnic minorities to
secede from the jurisdiction of a recognized sovereign mem-
ber-which had not committed international aggression-and
become recognized as independent sovereign entities of their
own right.
The UN policy toward the Yugoslavian dispute was driven
by the usual worries about setting a precedent for UN involve-
ment in conflicts which are essentially contained within the
borders of sovereign members. The reality is that many UN
member nations are similarly susceptible to the internal
schisms that have torn Yugoslavia apart and many are deeply
suspicious of any reading of the UN Charter that could expand
the right of the UN to intervene in such conflicts. This fear is
especially high in an age when the UN appears to be increas-
ingly dependent on American direction and support. For many
countries, the UN could not properly address the disputes and
conflicts without the agreement of the central government of
Yugoslavia. 9 Consequently, the Yugoslavian government's as-
under Article 40 was explicitly at the behest of the newly independent govern-
ment. See GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 71-72. On the other hand, the Secu-
rity Council denied such a request for intervention by the Czechoslovak represen-
tative in 1948 to counter what the government perceived as a threat to interna-
tional peace and security, on the ground that the request could not be treated as
a request by the government of a member state. M.S. RAJAN, supra note 57, at
122.
Obviously, such governmental requests will not be made where the claim is
the violation of human rights. Both the Security Council and the General Assem-
bly have, on at least one occasion, officially rejected the argument that it does not
have competence to deal with allegations of human rights violations by a govern-
ment of a member state, because such allegations implicate Charter provisions.
G.A. Res. 39 (I), Dec. 12, 1946, cited in GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 69
(The Assembly's recommendation of collective measures to secure a change of gov-
ernment in the Spanish case on the basis that the Franco regime itself posed a
threat to international peace and security). It however does "illustrate the willing-
ness of United Nations organs to encroach on traditional concepts of domestic
jurisdiction in the discharge of their responsibilities under the Charter, the limita-
tion of Article 2 (7) notwithstanding." GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 69.
68. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
69. Zimbabwe, India and China, for example, expressed strong reservations
about involvement in a country's internal affairs. See Weller, supra note 62, at
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sent was obtained before the Security Council first took up the
matter.70
The Security Council initially hid behind Chapter VIII of
the UN Charter, which governs the UN relationship with re-
gional organizations, and left it up to the European Commu-
nity (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) to mediate the conflicts among the Yugoslav
ethnic groups.7' There was considerable support inside and
outside Europe for this policy of treating Yugoslavia as a pri-
marily European problem. Today, there is widespread agree-
ment that the Europeans at best did not improve an already
bad situation.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the UN deferring
to highly capable regional organizations like the EC and CSCE
on matters that are essentially within their purview. This
posture is supportable under the UN Charter which urges
members to pursue peaceful settlement of local disputes
through regional agencies, and calls on the Security Council to
encourage such regional peaceful dispute settlement process-
es." Moreover, given growing demand for its intervention in
other parts of the world, the UN can hardly be criticized for
relying on European institutions to deal with a regional prob-
lem. However, once it reached the decision to become more
engaged in the conflicts, the UN can be chastised for both a
too-narrow vision of its capacity to act and for a woeful inabili-
ty to accomplish even its limited objectives.7"
578-79.
70. Apparently the explicit Yugoslav request that the Council convene to dis-
cuss the crisis was "elicited from the central authorities in Belgrade at the very
last minute, when it appeared that some members of the Council would have
otherwise raised objections under Article 2, 7." Weller, supra note 62, at 578. In
a very odd move, the Yugoslav delegate invoked his country's right to self-determi-
nation while urging a UN embargo on weapons shipments to all Yugoslav par-
ties--including the government he represented. Weller, supra note 62, at 578.
71. For a detailed discussion of the EC's and the CSCE's response to the
Yugoslavian crisis, see Weller, supra note 62, at 569. The UN waited until the
bloodshed in the Balkans was well under way before even convening a meeting of
the Council to discuss the matter. See Weller, supra note 62, at 577. It was not
until September, 1991, nearly three months after federal Yugoslav troops began
their attacks on the seceding republics that the Council passed Resolution 713
implementing the embargo by the members against weapons shipments to the
federal Yugoslav government. See Weller, supra note 62, at 579.
72. See U.N. CHARTER art. 52.
73. As of late 1994, heavy fighting continues in the Bosnia region of the for-
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2. The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of
Peoples
The Security Council debate on Yugoslavia centered on
how the organization could accommodate the competing legal
and political principles of self-determination of peoples and of
non-interference in domestic affairs of members. Opponents of
UN intervention in the Bosnian conflicts emphasized the "civil"
nature of the conflicts and the importance of maintaining the
jurisdictional line between what is international and what is
domestic. The supporters of UN intervention in the conflicts
accepted this basic characterization, but argued for interven-
tion by emphasizing the threat the conflicts posed to interna-
tional peace. Supporters of intervention also argued that UN
involvement would actually support the principle of self-detenninatiorL74
mer Yugoslavia, primarily between forces of the Bosnian Serbs and those of the
Muslim-led Bosnian government. The Bosnian Serbs have rejected the latest of a
series of UN plans for partitioning the region. A UN protection force of about
24,000 military and civilian personnel is deployed throughout the former Federa-
tion. While stability has been achieved in many parts of the former Federation,
the situation in Bosnia continues to deteriorate and there have been calls from
within the U.S. Congress for the U.S. to ignore a UN arms embargo and supply
arms to the Bosnian Muslims. The U.N. Chronicle has regular features on develop-
ments in the former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Return to 'Normal Life' in Sarajevo
Urged, 31 U.N. CHRON., 22 (1994); Tragedy Continues with 'No Sign of Abatement':
Internal Tribunal Established, 30 U.N. CHRON., 10, 40 (1993); see also Eric
Schmitt, Bosnia Peace Move May Bring U.S. Commitment, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1994, at A2; Chuck Sudetic, Bosnian Army and Serbs Agree to End Sniper Fire in
Sarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at A3.
74. The prevailing modem view of the principle of national self-determination
seems to be that "[ilt is for people to determine the destiny of the territory and
not the territory the destiny of the people." Western Sahara Case (Morocco v.
Mauritania), 1975 I.C.J. 116, 122 (Oct. 16) (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
One view reconciles the apparent conflict between the UN Charter's Article 1, 9 2
espousal of the right of peoples to self-determination with the Article 2, %1 7 prohi-
bition on intervention in the domestic affairs of states in favor of the first princi-
ple, so that the right of self-determination supersedes the rights of states to be
free from intervention. See GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 31. Commenta-
tors--not to mention great powers-point out the difficulty with taking such a
position literally. The 140-plus ethnic groups which comprise the former Soviet
Union would be hard-pressed to justify tribal squabbling over their nuclear weap-
ons. See Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of
Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 21, 23
(1992). The UN has on several occasions announced its commitment to the princi-
ple of self-determination. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N.
1994] THE ROLE OF THE UN AFTER FIFTY YEARS 283
Neither the principle of self-determination nor that of non-
interference in domestic affairs assist in developing a practical
basis for UN involvement in conflicts of the sort the organiza-
tion faces in Yugoslavia. The pressures for international inter-
vention today are as much a consequence of the sights and
sounds of media coverage as they are a result of international
insecurity deriving from a state versus state conflict. The UN
cannot maintain its credibility among "the peoples of the Unit-
ed Nations" if it continues to promote such a narrow reading of
its powers to aid oppressed people anywhere in the world. But
by focusing on the scale of human suffering in a con-
flict-rather than on the sensibilities of particular govern-
ments-as the basis for its jurisdiction to intervene, the UN
should be better able to bring more attention to destructive
conflicts even where international peace, strictly speaking, has
not been threatened.
Now is also the moment for the UN to reconsider the
meaning and value of the principle of self-determination. Re-
garding the situation in Yugoslavia, it is clear that the princi-
ple is being used to justify doing tremendous damage to a
world that has just begun to emerge from over four decades of
an all-consuming ideological conflict. Enough consideration was
not given to the full implication for the world of the early
stirrings of secessionist longings in Slovenia, Croatia, and
Macedonia and other regions of Yugoslavia. It was relatively
simple to identify the "self' in the self-determination claims of
those who were lucky enough to inhabit homogenous regions of
the country. But in heterogeneous regions like Croatia and
Bosnia, the definition of the "self' has become problematical.
While Croats and Bosnian Muslims saw themselves as perse-
cuted minorities within a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia, they
GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add.I (1960) (purpose
of the Charter is to develop friendly international relations based on respect for
equal rights and popular self-determination); see also the Aaland Islands Case,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 1, at 3 (1920) (opinions refusing to recognize
positive law right of national groups to secede from political authority). But cf.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
S.C. Res. 276, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1529th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/772 (1948), re-
printed in UNIFO, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUIENTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, 1948-1982, at 5 (1983).
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failed to anticipate or appreciate that Serbian minorities with-
in Croatia and Bosnia could have similar fears in contemplat-
ing an independent Croat-dominated Croatia, or an indepen-
dent Muslim-dominated Bosnia.
Much has been made of the history of hatred and violence
among these groups to explain the inevitability and, in a sense,
the unique nature of brutal conflicts among them. But in truth
much, if not most, of the world is Yugoslavia-in-waiting. The
ties that bind some of the ethnic or religious groups in India,
Nigeria, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium,
and Russia for example, are arguably no stronger than those
that once seemed to bind Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and Bosnian
Muslims in a unified Yugoslavia.75 Whatever the solution may
be to the tensions that exist among groups in diverse societies
throughout the world, it cannot be the case that every identifi-
able ethnic group should have a UN-cognizable claim to self-
determination that translates automatically into sovereign
nationhood.
To the extent that the principle of self-determination as
expressed in the UN Charter provides any sort of encourage-
ment to various ethnic groups contemplating non-amicable
secession, it must be re-examined. The UN may properly insist
upon the protection of individual human rights, and indeed
group rights, without encouraging the expectation that it will
come to the aid of every identifiable aggrieved minority group
in the world that sees salvation only in sovereign self-gover-
nance.
75. For example, since independence in 1947, India has had to contend with
religious and ethnic strife which has claimed the lives of three Indian lead-
ers-Mahatma Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and her son and successor,
Rajiv Gandhi. See RICHARD F. NYROP ET AL., INDIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 66, 377-78
(1985). Nigeria is made up of over 200 ethnic groups; roughly half are Muslims
and the other half practice Christianity and other religions. WILLIAI D. GRAF, THE
NIGERIAN STATE 5-6 (1988). Even modem Western countries like Spain and Bel-
gium face varying degrees of ethnic or similar divisions. On Spain, see FEDERAL
RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SPAIN: A COUNTRY STUDY 334-37
(1990). For recent developments in Belgium, see Alistair Brutton, Belgium: Who
Needs A Europe of the Regions, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 7, 1994, at 16; John
Carvel, Belgium: Constitutional Changes Will Not Split Belgium, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Feb. 18, 1993, at 8; John Palmer, Flemish Leader Calls for Split, THE
GUARDIAN (London), July 14, 1994, at 12.
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C. The UN in the Horn of Africa
The tragedy in Somalia," in all likelihood, would not
have occurred if the era of superpower conflict between the
East and the West had continued. Somalia, more precisely the
port of Berbera, located in the Gulf of Aden and overlooking
key oil shipping routes, was an attractive strategic asset to
both the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which
competed for nearly three decades to gain influence in the
Eastern African country.77 When the East-West rivalry ended
in the late eighties, Somalia, like many other client states in
the Third World, was no longer of much value to any of the
major powers.78
Consequently, neither the embattled Barre regime nor its
various opponents could attract enough outside support to gain
76. Somalia, which became independent in 1960, initially attracted Soviet
support. This support continued after civilian rule was replaced by a military
dictatorship under General Mohammed Siad Barre in 1969. FEDERAL RESEARCH
DVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 30, 39 (Helen C.
Metz ed., 4th ed. 1993). The Barre regime adopted "scientific socialism" as the
national ideology in part to ensure communist support and also to reduce the
influence of traditional Somali clan elders. Id. at xxiv-xxv, 39-42. In 1977, while
still a recipient of Soviet aid, Somalia invaded neighboring Ethiopia seeking to
seize the Ogaden, a largely barren Ethiopian-controlled territory, inhabited by
nomadic Somalis. The Soviets eventually abandoned Somalia and supported Ethio-
pia in the war. Somali forces were routed and hundreds of thousands of Somalis
were displaced. Id. at 182-84. At that point, the Barre regime decided to abandon
socialism and offered its service to the United States. Id. at xxvi, 176.
The Somali military defeat encouraged opposition to General Barre. In turn
the state became more repressive, with the regime actively promoting interclan
rivalry in order to divide the opposition. Id. at 45, 48-50. Foreign economic and
military assistance gave the Barre regime the means to placate and as necessary,
repress opposition for a time. By the late 1980s, the country was engulfed in an
increasingly brutal civil war which combined with a persistent drought to devas-
tate the country. Id. at 176-77, 210-13.
77. DAVID D. LArriN & SAID S. SAMATAR, SOMALIA: A NATION IN SEARCH OF A
STATE 144-45 (1987); see also Andrew Fields & Louisa Smith, Somalia: United
States Response to Human Rights Abuses, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205 (1990).
78. During a site visit to Somalia in January of 1993 the ever frank Secre-
tary-General Boutros-Ghali explained that part of the problems with negotiations
was "[t]he factions don't realize that the cold war is over. They still think they
can play countries off against each other." Hella Pick, supra note 8. Several days
later, while attending reconciliation talks in Addis Ababa with 14 of the Somali
factions in attendance, Boutros-Ghali responded to concerns over possible UN colo-
nial interests in the region by further clarifying the lack of strategic consider-
ations: "Nobody wants to take on a trusteeship, or to have military bases in So-
malia. Nobody has a strategic interest in your poor country." Helen Pick, supra
note 8.
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a decisive edge in the increasingly violent struggle to seize
state power.79 And with the opposition groups in agreement
only on the goal of removing the ruling Siad Barre regime, the
result for Somalia was a gradual descent into anarchy and
mass starvation.
For a country that was once considered one of the most
homogeneous societies in Africa, 0 the scale of violence, espe-
cially the combatants' callous disregard for the welfare of the
general population, was shocking. The civil war coupled with
the drought to fuel the famine. Hungry and desperate fighters,
increasingly without central control, turned against the inter-
national relief agencies, targeting the food supplies and con-
voys.8' By late 1992, the combination of war and drought had
created about a million Somali refugees outside the country.
The famine, virtually ignored by the Somali leaders as they
fought for control of state government, reached new heights.
An estimated twenty-five percent of Somali children under the
age of five were dead and up to one-third of the remaining
Somalis-about 1.5 million people-faced imminent starva-
tion.12 It was only at this point that the UN decided that So-
malia was a "unique situation" warranting extraordinary ef-
forts by the global institution. 3
At the time the Barre regime fled Mogadishu in late 1991,
the Cold War no longer presented a barrier to UN action in
Somalia. The UN response to the Somali situation from that
point on is less evidence of difficulties traceable to the Cold
War than it is indicative of an institution that lacks the capaci-
ty or will to respond to increased global demands and expecta-
tions.'
79. See Neil Henry, From Angola to Ethiopia, End of Cold War Transforms
Africa, WASH. POST, May 31, 1991, at Al.
80. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 76, at 57-
118; see also LAITIN & SAMATAR, supra note 77, at 21.
81. See Letter Dated 24 November 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24859
(1992) [hereinafter Letter from the Secretary-General to the Security Council].
82. See Mort Rosenblum, Somalia Famine Avoidable, Aid Workers Say, L-A.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at A16; U.N. Boosts Somalia Aid, Blue Berets Due to Go in,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP
File.
83. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 63, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/794 (1992).
84. During the Cold War, the UN was in no position to change the direction
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Undoubtedly, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the fear of set-
ting the wrong precedent regarding UN intervention was at
the heart of the Security Council's reluctance to take charge of
the situation in Somalia. Again, Article 2, Section 7 of the UN
Charter provided the convenient crutch for those who would
like to hold on to whatever remnants of protection are still
afforded by discredited notions of sovereignty and non-interfer-
ence in domestic affairs. As with the conflicts in the Persian
Gulf and the Balkans, it was only after a considerable loss of
human life that the UN overcame its narrow vision and began
to respond to the grave tragedy of Somalia. 5
The UN's failures in Somalia show the need for improve-
ment in three areas to prevent similar tragedies from recurring
in other countries in the future: (1) the provision of humanitar-
ian assistance, (2) the management of a deteriorating society,
and (3) the process of intervention after the decision to inter-
vene has been reached.
of Somalia. Like Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, and
many other Third World countries, Somalia, in the age of East-West competition,
was largely a testing ground for strategic doctrines and deadly new weapons.
While one could point to particular policies or priorities of the various UN agen-
cies involved in famine relief, or refugee affairs in Somalia, the fact is that in the
context of Cold War reality, superpower competition created enormous difficulties
for the UN. LAITIN & SAMATAR, supra note 77, at 129-52. Fair and legitimate
criticisms of the organization's role in Somalia should therefore focus on the post-
Cold War period.
85. The UN response to another tragedy of similar scale in Rwanda, under-
scores the need for the UN to overcome its narrow vision and improve its inter-
vention capabilities. As tribal killings mounted in the country, the UN first voted
to cut the peacekeeping force that was already in place in the country from about
1700 to about 270. Later, as international public opinion mounted for the UN to
act, the UN began the laborious process of negotiating with the United
States-which had ruled out sending American troops-over the training, equip-
ment, and deployment of the UN force. During the period of UN inaction, hun-
dreds of thousands of Rwandans are estimated to have perished from attacks and
disease. Millions of Rwandans have become refugees inside and outside their coun-
try. Michael Gordon, U.N.'s Rwanda Deployment Slowed by Lack of Vehicles, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1994, at A10; Paul Lewis, Security Council Votes to Cut Rwanda
Peacekeeping Force, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al; Keith B. Richburg, Tutsis
fear Transfer of Foreign Troops in Rwandan Safe Zone, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
1994, at A23; Steve Vogel, New Exodus Underway in Rwanda, WASH. POST, Aug.
14, 1994, at Al.
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1. The UN Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia
Even in terms of the acknowledged poor history of UN
humanitarian assistance operations generally, UN relief opera-
tions in Somalia were particularly troubled. 6 Many of the
problems resulted from an inadequate humanitarian budget,
absence of cooperation among UN agencies, and a growing
workload for the UN, as conflict in the region and elsewhere
worsened during the late eighties. Somali refugees had to com-
pete for scarce funds with refugees from Ethiopia and the
Sudan fleeing from equally violent conflicts in those neighbor-
ing countries. The difficulties in Somalia were compounded
when the UN agencies, including the World Food Program and
the UN High Commission for Refugees, pulled out of the coun-
try for security reasons in January 1991.7 These agencies re-
turned in early 1992 but the UN operation was still charac-
terized by ineffectiveness and a lack of coordination.
An overall UN coordinator, Ambassador Mohamed
Sahnoun, was finally appointed in April 1992. Within seven
months, however, this highly-respected Algerian diplomat who
had brought credibility to the UN operations in the country
was gone, forced to resign after he publicly noted that the UN
had failed to react to the Somalia crisis in a timely manner.8
A new coordinator was appointed but the problems afflicting
UN operations persisted. At one point, Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali himself was reported to have bitterly criticized
the Security Council for paying more attention to the problems
of Yugoslavia than to those of Somalia.89
86. See Ana Puga, Somalia: A Nation at the Abyss, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 16-17,
1992, at Al.
87. Id.
88. "The greatest difficulty is we did not try to cope with the situation earli-
er. . . the divisions and antagonisms have deepened and have taken on dimen-
sions that are almost inextricable." Jane Perlez, A Diplomat Matches Wits with
Chaos in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at D4 (a profile of Mohammed
Sahnoun). Sahnoun also criticized the UN for being "totally absent" from Somalia
for over a year. Keith Richburg, U.N. Envoy for Somalia Resigns Post, Blames Bu-
reaucracy, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1992, at A31. "It was a very, very long delay, and
a tragic delay ... we are now paying the price." Id. Specifically, Sahnoun be-
lieved the delay had increased the difficulty of later operations.
89. The Secretary-General reportedly accused the Security Council of putting
more resources into "the rich man's war" in Yugoslavia, while ignoring places like
Somalia. See, e.g., Trevor Rowe, Aid to Somalia Stymied; U.N. Votes Relief, but
Clan Blocks Effort, WASH. POST, July 29, 1992, at Al. Secretary-General Boutros-
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International media coverage finally forced the UN in late
1992 to acknowledge the true scale of the human suffering in
Somalia. Still, a comprehensive UN response was hampered by
the lack of an adequate organizational structure, necessary
expertise among personnel, sufficient material resources, and
quite critically, a proper vision of the UN's role in responding
to such global crises. The UN and its supporters have been
eloquent in pointing out the myriad reasons behind these ap-
palling shortcomings." The UN system cannot, however, con-
tinue to offer only excuses, no matter how valid, and expect to
be taken seriously in the post Cold War world. The capacity to
provide humanitarian assistance efficiently in deteriorating
societies like Somalia ought to be one of the central capabili-
ties of the UN in this age.9
2. The UN Reluctance to Take Charge in Somalia
It should have been evident to the UN by early 1992 that
the Somalis were past the capacity to organize their own af-
fairs. Most, if not all of the warring factions made no dis-
tinction between their political struggle and banditry; the
starving population, together with the personnel of the relief
agencies, were their preferred targets.93 The most accom-
Ghali later denied making such a statement. Alan Ferguson, U.N. Leader Says
Disarming Warlords Vital to Peace Plan, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 15, 1992, at A3.
90. See, e.g., Statement of John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, in DEPIt ST. DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 1992, at 752
[hereinafter Statement of John R. Bolton].
91. "M[The United Nations must lead the world community in humanitarian
efforts to confront disasters on the scale of Somalia's . . . ." Id. at 754.
92. The UN persisted until late 1992 with the policy of trying to get the
Somali groups to work together, with the UN playing no more than a supportive
role. Jonathan Clayton, U.N. May Get Tough With Somali Barons, REUTERS, Nov.
26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters Library Report File. As part
of this strategy, the UN turned to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and
the Arab League-two regional organizations that have never lived up to their
potential-for assistance. The earliest Security Council consideration of Somalia
evidenced this attitude. Security Council Resolution 733 of January 1992, while ex-
pressing "grave alarm" and "concern" at the 'situation" in Somalia, merely called
on these Somali "parties" to work with the UN to increase humanitarian assis-
tance and to promote reconciliation. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th
mtg. at 55, U.N. Doc. S/RES/732 (1992). Fortunately, the Security Council decided
to remain "seized of the matter." Id. at 56.
93. See Letter from the Secretary-General to the Security Council, supra note
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plished of the bandits became known internationally as war-
lords, who, among other outrages, extorted payments from UN
and other relief agencies in exchange for not attacking food
suppliers. The UN, however, saw these warlords as necessary
partners in its efforts to reverse the deterioration in Somalia.
In a sense, what the UN was given by the breakdown of
civil society in Somalia beginning in late 1991 was a propitious
opportunity to develop novel structures and methods of dealing
with the problems posed by the degeneration of governmental
authority in a post colonial, post-Cold War nation-state. 4 Un-
fortunately, the UN was neither ready nor inclined to consider
this responsibility. It was not until late 1992, and then only
with great reluctance, that it did. Thus, until then, the world
community witnessed the confusing spectacle of the UN refus-
ing to intervene in Somalia without the approval of the very
people who. had worked assiduously to destroy the country and,
in many cases, to deliberately starve hundreds of thousands of
people.
Eventually, in September 1992, the UN took tentative
steps toward a comprehensive management of the Somalia
tragedy. Five hundred Pakistani troops were deployed-with
the agreement of all the Somalian parties-to guard UN hu-
manitarian operations in the country." The Pakistani troops
were promptly confined to their quarters due to threats from
the parties the UN had so diligently courted.96
By late November 1992, as attacks on UN personnel and
relief workers mounted, the Secretary-General pleaded with
the Security Council to expand UN intervention in the coun-
try. 7 UN members were then convinced of the unique charac-
94. A reporter described the situation this way: "Just over 30 years after it
officially became an independent nation, Somalia essentially has ceased to exist.
The land mass . . . is now a dangerous and chaotic place of clan-based warfare,
feudal fiefdoms, marauding free-lance gunmen and widespread famine that kills
thousands each day." Keith B. Richburg, Can Battered Somalia Be Pieced Back
Together?, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1992, at A20.
95. See S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. %% 4, 5 (1992);
Letter Dated 12 August 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24451 (1992).
96. Jonathan Clayton, U.N. May Get Tough With Somali Barons, REUTERS,
Nov. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters Library Report File.
97. In a letter of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council, the Secre-
tary-General said: "The cycle of extortion and blackmail must . . . be broken and
security conditions established that will permit the distribution of relief supplies."
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ter of the Somalia situation." At that point, the United States
expressed a willingness to lead a UN-sanctioned, but U.S.-
controlled military intervention in Somalia with up to 30,000
United States troops.99 The Secretary-General presented the
Security Council with an alternative plan for a UN-controlled
military force to intervene in Somalia.'00 On December 3, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 794, which sanctioned a
U.S.-led" forcible intervention-not the Secretary-General's
plan-under chapter VII of the UN Charter. 10'
The pronounced UN reluctance to intervene in a compre-
hensive fashion in Somalia until late 1992 was particularly
disturbing because it occurred during the same period that the
UN intervened in Iraq on behalf of the Kurds and Shiites. The
case for a much more timely forcible UN intervention in Soma-
lia was probably stronger than the case for the UN military
intervention in aid of the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq. Unlike the
UN action in Iraq, which took place against the vociferous
objections of the recognized government of Iraq, there was no
such government or like authority in Somalia to object to UN
intervention.' 2 The objections in the Somalia case came
See Letter from the Secretary-General to the Security Council, supra note 81.
98. See Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and
Forty-Fifth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3145
(1992) [hereinafter Provisional Verbatim Record]. The debate shows that there was
a deep division between those who saw UN intervention as essentially a short-
term venture to open up the delivery of relief and those who contemplated a lon-
ger term commitment to help rebuild civil society in Somalia.
99. President George Bush, Humanitarian Mission to Somalia, Address to the
Nation (Dec. 4, 1992), in DEPVr ST. DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1992, at 865; see also Secu-
rity Council Mulling Large Multinational Force to Somalia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Nov. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
100. Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from Secretary General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24868
(1992)[hereinafter Letter Dated 29 November 1992]. The Secretary-General would
later argue that the United States changed the nature of the Somalia intervention
after the Security Council accepted the United States offer. The Secretary-General
supported immediate disarmament of the Somali factions while the United States
preferred a more limited approach at the time. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 89.
101. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 83. During the Security Council deliberation
preceding the adoption of the Resolution, representatives from many countries that
would ordinarily oppose any UN intervention that hinted at interference in domes-
tic affairs acknowledged that Somalia was a unique situation. China made it clear
that it had reservations about UN authorized unilateral intervention by the United
States and to a long term military operation. See Provisional Verbatim Record,
supra note 98.
102. See Provisional Verbatim Report, supra note 98; Statement of John R.
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largely from others in the UN, who were unwilling to commit
to the view that the ideal of sovereignty should never be a
barrier to a comprehensive global response to mass starvation,
especially in a situation where no responsible civil authority
exists.
3. The UN and the Process of Intervention in Somalia
Once the UN decided to intervene in Somalia, its process
of forcible intervention was flawed in at least three very impor-
tant aspects. First, the decision to proceed initially with an
American intervention, instead of one entirely within UN con-
trol and structure, served to underline the organization's de-
pendence on United States military power.' 3 Second, the de-
cision to pursue cooperation with the various factions after the
military intervention, to the point of allowing them to retain
much of their weaponry, weakened the authority of the inter-
vening forces and encouraged continued resistance to UN au-
thority."4 Finally, the UN intervention unwisely centered
around the task of facilitating humanitarian relief rather than
pacifying the country.
a. An American Operation
Supporters have argued that the initial American military
intervention, followed weeks later by a UN operation, was the
most efficient operation that could have been undertaken given
the meager resources and limited expertise of the UN. This
argument however, ignores the fact that the UN is as capable
as its members wish it to be. The UN clearly would have pos-
sessed the personnel and other resources to mount such an
operation if the American personnel who initially performed so
credibly in Somalia had been placed under UN control.
Bolton, supra note 90.
103. The differing perspectives were captured in a news report at the time.
U.N. Says Force Alone Can Ensure Aid Shipment to Somalia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
104. In a December 8, 1992 letter to President Bush, Secretary-General Boutros
Ghali had urged that "any forceful action . . . must have the objective of ensuring
that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and
brought under international control." Excerpts From Letter of U.N. Chief to Presi-
dent Bush, REUTERS, Dec. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters
Library Report file. His plea was ignored until it was too late.
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By invoking its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter and then authorizing an operation outside its control, the
Security Council-as in the Gulf War case-lost an opportu-
nity to institutionalize the process of UN military intervention.
The Security Council could indeed have utilized the opportuni-
ty presented in Somalia to give substance to the process out-
lined in the UN Charter for such interventions. 5 Under Ar-
ticle 43, Section 1, of the UN Charter, the Security Council is
to reach "special agreements" with all members concerning the
armed units which they would make available for use by the
UN in maintaining international peace and security.10 6 Under
Article 45, members also are to "hold immediately available
national air-force contingents for combined international en-
forcement action."
To assist and advise the Security Council on the use of
these forces, Article 47 authorized the creation of a Military
Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff or represen-
tatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members.0 7
None of these requirements or procedures were followed in the
Somalia intervention. Instead, the long-standing preference of
American military leaders to control the deployment of Ameri-
can troops won out over the need to institutionalize and stren-
gthen UN authority and power.
In the short term, the United States preference to work
largely outside the UN structure may have allowed UN mili-
tary intervention in Somalia to be performed more readily and
efficiently. And, under present realities, the UN may well have
no practical alternative to going along with the United States
desires in this regard. But this is a disservice not only to the
institution but to broader United States interests. Inevitably,
interventions that are perceived to be U.S.-in-fact, even when
authorized by the UN, are open to greater suspicion, criticisms,
and opposition on anti-imperialist grounds by foreign leaders
and people. More importantly, the American people have dem-
onstrated a decreasing tolerance for what they see as the dis-
proportionately large burden placed on the United States by
the UN system. Finally, for major powers like Germany and
105. U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII. See generally id. arts. 43-47.
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, % 1.
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 47.
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Japan with powerful domestic opposition to foreign deployment
of their armed forces, the development and utilization of truly
multilateral UN forces could have served to relieve some of the
anxiety that feeds their domestic opposition, thus enabling
these countries to contribute much more to the global commu-
nity.
b. Bitter Harvest
The intervention forces have paid a huge price for the
initial policy of cooperation with armed Somali factions that
included allowing them to retain much of their weapons. Com-
plete disarmament of the Somali factions, which had presided
over the starvation of hundreds of thousands of innocent citi-
zens, should have been the top priority'of the unauthorized
American and UN forces. Given the absence of any recogniz-
able form of government, such disarmament policy could hard-
ly have raised concerns about violations of state sovereignty.
Nevertheless, disarming these forces did not become a priority
until months after the UN had pursued a policy of cooperating
with them. The subsequent and continuing attacks on UN
forces can be traced directly to this policy of cooperation, which
clearly served to foster a sense of legitimacy and importance
among these factions.' Their violence and intransigent ori-
entation had been, in effect, rewarded. Of even greater concern
is the confusing signal the policy of cooperation with the fac-
tions sent to the outside world about their legitimacy. The
policy of cooperation made explanations of subsequent UN
military operations aimed at disarming the factions much more
difficult and less convincing.0 9
The thrust of the U.S.-led and controlled UN intervention
was not to bring violators of gross human rights to justice or
108. See Jennifer Parmelee, Somalis at Peace Parley Jockey for Power, WASH.
POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at A24.
109. President Clinton's comments at a June 1993 news conference illustrated
the difficulty. He stated that "the United Nations and the United States never
listed getting rid of Aidid as one of our objectives. In fact, as long as he was will-
ing to cooperate with the United Nations, he was able to live and work in peace
right there in Mogadishu." Text of President Clinton's News Conference, WASH.
PQST, June 18, 1993, at A10. A few minutes earlier, he had accused General
Aidid, leader of the most intrasigent Somali faction of murdering 23 UN peace-
keepers and of responsibility "for the deaths of countless Somalis from starvation,
from disease and from killing." Id.
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even to deprive them of their means to continue in their crimi-
nal behavior. Further, the UN was unprepared and deeply
reluctant to acknowledge the absence of civil authority in the
country. Although the UN appeared to have counted on the
Somali combatants developing sufficient humanitarian concern
and political maturity and to cease fighting and turn to the
task of rebuilding their country, such hopes were not reward-
ed. On the contrary, after a short interval following the inter-
vention, the UN forces came under devastating and sustained
assault from one of the factions led by General Mohammed
Farah Aidid." °
By the time the attacks convinced the UN of the need to
disarm the factions, it was much too late. Security Council
Resolution 814 of March 1993 officially conceded the "funda-
mental importance of a comprehensive and effective program
for disarming Somali parties. . . ."' It should have come as
no surprise that the factions vigorously resisted the efforts to
disarm them, causing significant casualties among UN troops
and Somalis in the process. Another major casualty was the
image and legitimacy of the UN.
c. Humanitarian Focus of Intervention
The policy of cooperating with the armed factions was
directly tied to the view that the Somali intervention was es-
sentially a large scale humanitarian relief operation. The UN
realized rather belatedly that its mission in Somalia had to go
beyond merely facilitating the delivery of food to starving peo-
ple and mediating among combatants. Under tremendous pres-
sure from global public opinion, the UN began to consider
110. In one clash, eighteen American soldiers and about 300 Somalis died when
American forces were ambushed as they raided an Aidid stronghold in an effort to
arrest faction members, pursuant to a UN order. This raid turned American lead-
ers and the public against the American role in Somalia and led to the withdraw-
al of most of the American troops a few months later. Dozens of UN troops from
other nations have died in carrying out the UN mission in Somalia. John M.
Cushman, Jr., Death Toll About 300 in October 3 U.S.-Somali Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1993, at A12; Elaine Sciolino, A Truce is Offered by Somali General to
U.N.-U.S. Forces, N.Y. TIMES, October 10, 1993, at Al; U.N. Forces Hunt Killers of
Indian Peacekeepers, REUTERS, August 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters Library Report File.
111. S.C. Res 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3138th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/814 (1993).
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directly supervising the administration of Somalia for an inter-
im period.' This shift from an essentially humanitarian re-
lief orientation to a more comprehensive intervention in Soma-
lia meant emphasizing the gradual development of responsible
governmental and quasi-governmental institutions and struc-
tures in the country.
The original Security Council mandate for the intervention
was actually broad enough to cover such UN involvement in
Somalia."' This was consistent with the view of the UN Sec-
retary-General, who had urged a mandate for intervention that
was broad enough to include the disarmament of all the com-
batants."' Unfortunately, in the initial implementation of the
mandate, the U.S.-led intervening forces limited their role
largely to facilitating relief assistance.'15
Within six months of the start of the intervention, howev-
er, UN and United States forces were engaged in a bloody
conflict with one of the principal armed groups in Somalia. The
policy of cooperation with the armed factions-including allow-
ing them to retain much of their weaponry-had proved a
failure. Not until this point was the mission of the UN forces
broadened beyond primarily supporting humanitarian relief
operations. Security Council Resolution 814 of March 1993
noted the "general absence of the rule of law in Somalia," and
acknowledged the "fundamental importance of a comprehen-
sive and effective program for disarming Somali parties, in-
112. From late 1992 through the first half of 1993, there were many calls for
the establishment of an international trusteeship over Somalia. See, e.g., Paul
Johnson, Colonialism's Back-and Not a Moment Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1993, (Magazine), at 22; Jane Perlez, Trusteeship Idea Floated, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 1992, at A9; Elaine Sciolino, U.N. Council Essentially Agrees to U.S. Command
in Somalia; Doubts at the C.IA., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at A18; Robert I.
Rothberg, Struggling Nations Need Guidance, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR., May 14,
1993, at 19. After the Somalia intervention came under severe criticism in late
1993, the calls for deeper UN involvement ended.
113. Even though Security Council Resolution 794 emphasized the establish-
ment of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, it clearly ac-
knowledged the need "to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to
facilitating the process of a political settlement .... " S.C. Res. 794, supra note
83, at 64.
114. See Letter Dated 29 November 1992, supra note 100.
115. Text of Letter to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, Washington, D.C., (Dec. 10, 1992), in DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Dec. 14,
1992, at 877.
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cluding movements and factions .... ,116
III. THE UNITED NATIONS AGENDA FOR PEACE
On January 31, 1992, the Security Council asked the UN
Secretary-General to prepare a special report on how the UN's
international peace and security work could be enhanced with-
in the framework established by the UN Charter. 7 Less
than six months later on June 17, Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali issued a report in which he discussed in broad terms the
problems facing the UN and outlined several ways in which
the UN's legitimacy and effectiveness could be strengthened in
light of the supposedly improved international climate of the
post-Cold War era.'18
A. Agenda for Peace Generally
The Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace report actually
says little that is new in terms of an analysis of critical issues
or ideas for reform. The Report is valuable, however, for at
least two reasons: (1) it is the first comprehensive official study
of the UN in the post-Cold War period, and (2) it puts the im-
primatur of the administrative branch of the UN-albeit timid-
ly-on ideas that could improve the organization's legitimacy
and effectiveness in responding to problems of international
peace and security.
The first substantive section of the Report discusses the
changing global context. The next five sections define and
discuss UN operations in terms of four concepts: preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-
building."' In the last three substantive sections, the Report
116. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 83.
117. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2.
118. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2.
119. "Peacekeeping" usually refers to limited UN activities in the area of
ceasefire defense; ordinarily UN peacekeeping forces may engage only if attacked,
and their presence is invariably by consent of all parties to the dispute. Alan K.
Henrikson, Defining A New World Order: The Pletcher Roundtable, 43-46 (May 2-
3, 1991) (discussion paper, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, on file with
the Georgetown Law Journal), cited in Miller, supra note 20, at 774 n.5. The usu-
al term for full Chapter VII UN military involvement is "peace-enforcement." See
D.W. BOWETr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 37-41 (4th ed. 1982).
Apparently the Secretary-General uses the term "peace enforcement" to mean some
type of intermediate force between the two. See Miller, supra note 20, at 789 n.82.
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briefly covers regional relationships, the safety of UN person-
nel,2 ' and institutional financing.
The Report's introduction acknowledges the restricted
scope of the Security Council's charge, which pointedly limited
the Secretary-General to a study "within the framework and
provisions of the Charter... " dealing with the capacity of the
organization for "preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and
for peacekeeping."' 2 ' The Secretary-General broadened the
mandate to some extent by recognizing that problems of inter-
national peace and insecurity are directly connected to prob-
lems of global economic and social inequality and problems of
environmental degradation.'22
The Report notes the changing international context that
made the commissioning of the Report and the serious consid-
eration of the reform ideas possible. 2 ' It also notes the irony
that the end of the Cold War, which made contemplation of an
increased UN role realistic, has also contributed to the unle-
ashing of destructive global forces that now threaten the UN's
existence. 24 The Report sees these destructive forces as part
of "uniquely contradictory trends," the most notable being that
popular demands for self-determination and national sover-
eignty are increasing even as technology, trade, and environ-
mental concerns move the nations of the world closer togeth-
120. This section's inclusion in the report served no practical purpose. The fact
that UN personnel serve in circumstances of great danger is well-known and un-
disputed. So is their courage. It is difficult to see what the Secretary-General
proposes to do to better ensure their safety given the growing need for their ser-
vices. There is the danger here that concern for the safety of UN personnel would
become paramount, thus reducing their effectiveness or their special quality and
consequently, the UN's legitimacy. The Pakistani troops under UN command that
remained confined to their quarters for months while anarchy reigned in
Mogadishu were safe but thoroughly ineffective and discredited in the eyes of the
Somali people. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 17-21.
121. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992).
122. Specifically, the Report stated:
The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them
will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social de-
velopment for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the
existence and use of massively destructive weapons.
Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 2.
123. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 3.
124. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 3.
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er.'25 The Report describes the dilemma facing the UN in this
manner: "The United Nations has not closed its doors. Yet if
every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood,
there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security
and economic well-being for all would become ever more diffi-
cult to achieve."'26 The Report offers no resolution to this di-
lemma. It does, however, suggest that the concept of self-deter-
mination needs to be redefined to emphasize global standards
and guarantees for individual and group rights, rather than
statehood for every group that is, or considers itself to be, ag-
grieved. 1
27
The Report recommends five ways to improve the UN's
capability in preventing and resolving conflicts: (1) identify as
early as possible the sources of conflicts and employ preventive
diplomacy 2 to remove them; (2) resolve conflicts that have
erupted through peacemaking; (3) preserve the peace, achieved
by the peacemakers, through peacekeeping; (4) assist in peace-
building 29 once peace has been achieved, and (5) address the
125. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 3.
126. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 5.
127. As of September, 1993, there were 184 members of the UN. Andorra,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Eritrea, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mace-
donia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Namibia, North Korea, San
Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Tajikhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan became members between 1990 and 1993. 30 U.N. CHRON. at i (1993).
128. The Report's description of how preventive diplomacy would work is un-
fortunately quite unimaginative. The focus is on such well-tried and unremarkable
measures as building confidence, fact-finding and early warning. Agenda for Peace,
supra note 2, at 7-8. The Report, however, does endorse increased UN resort to
preventive deployment and the establishment of demilitarized zones prior to the
start of a conflict. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 8, 9-10. But even these
relatively new departures were in general predicated upon the UN first gaining
the agreement of the parties to the conflict. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 8,
9. Traditionally, these measures have been pursued by the UN only after conflicts
have erupted and, very often, only upon their conclusion. Agenda for Peace, supra
note 2, at 8, 9. These suggestions definitely need to be considered and developed
further. It would be a tragedy if they were used only in those instances cited in
the Report.
129. Peace-building is defined as a comprehensive process of consolidating peace
and fostering a return to normalcy in order to enable the peacekeeping forces to
leave as quickly as possible. It involves not only the rebuilding of tangible struc-
tures and institutions destroyed by war, but also the reinventing of a "sense of
confidence and well-being among people." The ability to repatriate and resettle
refugees, clear landmines, reconstruct an economy for peacetime production, rebuild
or strengthen governmental and social institutions, retrain security personnel,
promote links between former enemies and perform all the other tasks essential to
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underlying causes of conflict which the report identifies gener-
ally as economic despair, social injustice and political oppres-
sion.
The Report clearly reflects the contradictory desires and
expectations confronting the UN in the post-Cold War world.
The world expects the UN to help provide the hundreds of
thousands of people who are dying in an escalating number of
local and regional conflicts at a time when the members of the
organization, with sufficient resources to intervene, are in-
creasingly reluctant to do so. The Report makes only a few
tentative suggestions; its drafters, eschewing any bold depar-
ture, were more concerned with retaining some consensus than
providing global leadership. Such an ostensibly pragmatic
attitude might be defensible if the UN was able to gain sup-
port for its modest proposals. This has not been the case. As
such, an historic opportunity to provide a vision of the future
and address the underlying structural weaknesses of the UN
was wasted on reform proposals that were, in the main, timid
and uninspiring. A closer examination of the key sections on
peacemaking, peacekeeping, regional cooperation, and financ-
ing will buttress this criticism.
B. Key Aspects
1. Peacemaking
In discussing how the UN could improve its role in peace-
making, the Report proposed a more activist role for the orga-
nization than it had previously observed in the past. Still, the
Report was careful not to go beyond the current understanding
of the boundaries set by the UN Charter. Essentially, the Re-
port saw the main peacemaking task currently facing the UN
to be reviving and institutionalizing the powers and responsi-
bilities described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.'
prevent a recurrence of conflict is what dictates success or failure in post-conflict
peace-building. These measures are also very costly to the United Nations system.
The Report confirmed these realities and made the standard pleas for more
contributions from members. It also broached two ideas for reducing conflict: pre-
ventive demilitarization and promoting the rule of law and other democratic prac-
tices. Surprisingly, the Report failed to develop these ideas which lately have at-
tracted considerable support in the international community. Agenda for Peace,
supra note 2, at 6-9.
130. Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with threats to peace, breaches of
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The Report observed that the Security Council had not
seized the opportunities presented by the conflict in the Per-
sian Gulf to give life and credibility to these measures. In
particular, the Report argued that it was essential to the legiti-
macy and effectiveness of the Security Council that it develop
and institutionalize the option granted by Article 42 of the
Charter to use force to restore international peace and security
when peaceful means fail. The Report noted that use of force
by the Security Council in this context does "require bringing
into being, through negotiations, the special agreements fore-
seen in Article 43 ....
Article 43 brings up perhaps the most controversial provi-
sion of the UN Charter today. Both supporters and opponents
of UN authority recognize the symbolic and real importance of
this provision under which all members of the UN "undertake
to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed
forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security."1 32 Such forces and facilities would provide the
Security Council with considerably greater independence, free-
dom and flexibility to act in response to a breach of the peace
than it currently possesses. Many commentators have ex-
pressed concern-and some, bitter opposition-to the idea of a
UN with this much independence and power. 33 The Report
forthrightly urged members to conclude the required special
bilities given to the organization under this Chapter probably would have been
realized for some time now were it not for the Cold War.
131. The drafters of the Charter had three choices with respect to the
organization's capacity to use force. First was the choice of a unitary international
force; however, because of the encroachment upon national sovereignty such a force
would represent, this option was rejected at the San Francisco Conference. Second
was an ad hoc coalition, as envisaged by the League Covenant, and which was
likely to be largely ineffective. Third was the ratification of advance agreements,
proposed by the United States at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Members
would agree to keep international peacekeeping forces at the disposal of the orga-
nization subject to Security Council approval. Unfortunately, the major powers dis-
agreed on questions of location, size and jurisdiction. The insurmountable issue, of
course, was whether such forces could ever be deployed against a major power.
The Soviet Union understandably opposed such use of Article 43 forces, as well as
any use of the forces absent unanimous agreement of the permanent members.
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 321-24.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1.
133. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. But see Boren, supra note 23.
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agreements that would open the way to the designation of na-
tional forces available to the UN-Article 43 forces-and their
ready availability for use on a permanent basis by the Security
Council to deter and combat aggression.
As envisaged by the Secretary-General, these forces would
be sufficiently large and equipped to meet threats from any
quarter except "a major army equipped with sophisticated
weapons."134 The conclusion of these agreements and the des-
ignation of these forces would undoubtedly encourage those
who have championed a supranational entity that would have
an independently controlled force, recruited, trained, and
equipped to serve either as a supplement to, or as a replace-
ment for, all national armies.
Unfortunately, the Report may have undermined the time-
ly realization of the Article 43 agreements by suggesting that
an interim force, named "peace-enforcement units," be created
since the proposed Article 43 forces, the Report concedes, "are
not likely to be available for some time to come."135 These
peace-enforcement units would consist of volunteers and would
be "more heavily armed" versions of the traditional UN peace-
keeping forces. However, it is somewhat unclear from the Re-
port how these provisional forces would be distinguished from
the true Article 43 forces. Both would be available on call, both
would come under the control of the Security Council and the
Secretary-General, and both would be capable of responding
with force to international aggression.136 It seems that the
Secretary-General contemplated that the Article 43 forces
would be used to respond to acts of aggression, while the inter-
im peace-enforcement units would be deployed only where
traditional peacekeeping troops have proven inadequate to the
task of peacekeeping and there is a need to use force to restore
and maintain a cease-fire. Thus, as conceived by the Report,
the reformed UN would have at least three types of forces at
its disposal: (1) traditional peace-keepers, (2) peace-enforce-
ment units, and (3) Article 43 forces.
Without challenging the role of the Security Council as the
134. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 13.
135. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 13.
136. The Secretary-General asserts that this type of volunteer force would pri-
marily be responsible for enforcing ceasefire agreements, and that its terms of
reference would be defined in advance. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 13.
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dominant organ in peacemaking, the Report called for an ex-
panded role for the ICJ in this area. Its key recommendation
in this regard, however, echoed the oft-stated goal of having all
UN members accept the general jurisdiction of the World
Court under Article 36 of its statute,'37 "without any reserva-
tion, before the end of the United Nations Decade of Interna-
tional Law in the year 2000.""' The Report noted that the
Security Council presently has the "power" to recommend that
members submit disputes to the ICJ." 9 The Report could
have been improved by a discussion of how this power to rec-
ommend could be strengthened, perhaps by changing it into a
power of the Security Council to require that members submit
certain types of disputes-especially disputes over territo-
ries-to the Court before they escalate into violent conflicts.
2. Peacekeeping
Turning to the organization's role in global peacekeeping,
the Report adopted what may be an overly generous assess-
ment of the organization's contributions to international peace
and stability. The authors of the Report interpreted the grow-
ing demand for UN peacekeeping operations--only thirteen
from 1945 to 1987, but thirteen others from 1987 to 1992-as
evidence not of the failure of the UN efforts to promote peace,
but of its contribution to global stability. The Report cited the
many problems plaguing UN peacekeeping work and blamed
them on three factors: (1) lack of adequate funding, (2) inade-
quate logistical support, and (3) insufficiently trained person-
nel. However, the Secretary-General's recommendations for
dealing with these problems were disappointingly modest. To
deal with the growing cost of peacekeeping-estimated at
about $3 billion for 1992-the Report called for the consider-
137. The Statute of the International Court of Justice outlines the two basic
methods by which the court gets jurisdiction to decide contentious cases. Both
methods require the consent of the parties. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE art. 36. The first is by the parties specifically agreeing to refer a case
to the court. Id. % 2. The second method allows for a so-called compulsory juris-
diction where a party has either agreed in advance in a bilateral or multilateral
instrument that it accepts the court's jurisdiction or has made a unilateral decla-
ration in advance-usually with reservations-that the court has jurisdiction over
it with regard to certain classes of disputes. Id.
138. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 11.
139. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 11.
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ation of new means of financing peacekeeping assessments. Yet
the only specific proposal endorsed by the Report is for peace-
keeping. contributions to be taken out of members' defense
budgets, as opposed to their foreign affairs budgets. It is diffi-
cult to see the improvement this proposal would make since it
would still leave the financing of this critical UN activity un-
der the control of individual countries.
On the issue of logistical support, the Report called for
either pre-positioned stocks of basic peacekeeping equipment
or commitments from governments to keep certain kinds of
equipment on stand-by for use by the UN when needed. The
Report also sought pledges from members with the necessary
capabilities to transport UN forces free of charge or at low cost.
To increase the number of competent military, police and
civilian personnel available for peacekeeping work, the Report
vaguely asked members to work with the UN to train person-
nel who could serve with the organization. It also urged states
to cooperate with the organization in developing a register of
trained personnel and in improving the quality of the military
staff serving in the Secretariat. 4 ' Recent difficulties getting
trained UN personnel to serve in Rwanda affirm that improve-
ment in this area is unlikely under the present orientation of
the UN.'
3. Regional Cooperation
The Report's examination of the UN's relationship to re-
gional entities focused on the potential for expanded collabora-
tion in the post-Cold War period. The Report noted that Chap-
ter VIII of the UN Charter allowed a role for regional bodies
provided that they worked on matters "appropriate for regional
action" and their work was "consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations."' The Cold War had fos-
tered regional groupings that frustrated UN purposes and
principles. The Report touted recent instances in which the UN
had worked with regional organizations such as the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) and the EC to promote peace and
security.
140. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 15.
141. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
142. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 17.
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The Report endorsed the continuation and deepening of
such cooperation in the future under the leadership of the UN
Security Council. The Report expressly refused to provide more
detailed guidelines for such future relationships and supported
continued flexibility and creativity "as no two regions or situa-
tions are the same .... ,,4
This assessment of the potential for UN cooperation with
regional arrangements is probably too optimistic. None of the
regional organizations can be credited with much success in
dealing with current crises in their respective areas. The OAU
has had very little impact in Somalia, and the EC has been
criticized for its role in the Balkans conflict. Indeed, on an
issue such as international trade, existing and developing
regional groupings such as the EC and NAFTA have the poten-
tial to exacerbate international tensions. On the whole though,
it is probably wise for the UN not to attempt to impose rigid
guidelines on its relationships with these regional groups at a
time when its own legitimacy and effectiveness are being ques-
tioned.
4. Financing
The Report's financing section outlined several funding
proposals including a few that were already before the UN
General Assembly for consideration. 4 4 The proposals before
the General Assembly were generally modest ideas for improv-
ing the organization's cash flow and money management prob-
lems. One of these proposals would create a Peace Endowment
Fund with an initial target of $1 billion that would be invested
to provide funding for UN peacekeeping activities. If this pro-
posal were to come to fruition, it could begin to give the UN
the stability and independence it so badly needs in obtaining
funding for its operations.45
143. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 17.
144. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 20.
145. The Secretary-General reckoned the 1992 peacekeeping operations costs to
be three billion dollars, in addition to an outstanding UN debt to troop-contribut-
ing countries of eight million dollars for past operations. Against this figure the
Report measured an estimated world defense outlay of nearly one trillion dollars,
and the even greater costs of international war. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2,
at 14. The proposed one billion dollar Peace Endowment Fund would be raised
through "a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions," the latter coming
from members, individuals and private sources. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at
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Other more imaginative and controversial funding ideas
mentioned in the Report included levies on global arms sales
and international air travel and general tax exemptions for
"charitable" contributions made to the UN by individuals, cor-
porations and foundations. The specific recommendations of
the Secretary-General, however, did not stray far from the
realm of realism and modesty. Apart from a request for the
immediate creation of a fifty million dollars revolving peace-
keeping reserve fund, the specific recommendations dealt only
with ways to improve money management and cash flow.
Showing a keen appreciation of widespread negative views of
UN bureaucracy, the Secretary-General embraced longstanding
criticisms of the organization's management practices and
highlighted the steps already taken to streamline the bureau-
cracy and improve productivity.
IV. BEYOND THE AGENDA FOR PEACE: RESTRUCTURING THE
UNITED NATIONS FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
The Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace report concluded
with a strong appeal for continued and increased support of
the UN. Recalling the fate of the League of Nations, he sug-
gested that the UN had been given a second chance with the
end of the Cold War and that the world must celebrate its "re-
stored possibilities," mindful of the lessons of the past.'46 The
Report praised the new-found collegiality of the Security Coun-
cil and urged the promotion of democracy within and among
nations. Democracy in this sense, according to the Report,
would encompass respect for the fundamental freedoms in the
UN Charter and respect for the rights and needs of minorities
and other "more vulnerable" groups in society. 4 ' This vision
of democracy, the Report suggested, ought to govern the poli-
cies of individual members within their own societies and also
in their relationships with each other if the ideals of the orga-
nization are to be realized.
It would be quite difficult to come up with a better way to
end any report-even one as cautious as this-that speaks to
through "a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions," the latter coming
from members, individuals and private sources. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at
20-21.
146. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 22.
147. Agenda for Peace, supra note 2, at 23.
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the future of an institution that is the repository of the hopes
of so much of humanity. The paean to democracy is a recogni-
tion of the fact that the organization needs an organizing phi-
losophy. The UN, like the peoples of the world it was created
to represent, needs faith as well as technical competence and
abundant resources. Democracy is the new organizing princi-
ple-an ideology of sorts-on which the UN could build its
legitimacy and effectiveness. How it can better do this is the
subject of the final section of this article.
The narrow scope of the Agenda For Peace study does an
injustice to a world community which for too long has had to
define international relations in terms of conflicts between
groups. An alternative plan for UN revitalization would con-
tain at least four elements, each designed to improve both the
image and substance of the UN and make the organization a
more legitimate and effective global institution.
The first element would require a change in institutional
philosophy. The UN would issue an explicit pledge or guaranty
that it would promote democratic governance for all members
by initiating a system for establishing the credentials of na-
tional representatives to the UN and rejecting the credentials
of those from non-democratic governments. The second element
would entail a restructuring of the UN General Assembly. The
current system of equal representation in the General Assem-
bly would be replaced by one that is based on national popula-
tion of members and their financial contribution to the total
UN budget. It would also require that national representatives
to the UN be directly elected by the citizens of each member
country. The third element would also be structural. It would
provide greater legitimacy and effectiveness to the UN by re-
placing the UN Security Council with two bodies: a new UN
Executive Committee, chosen by the elected representatives to
the UN, and charged "with primary responsibility for the ma-
intenance of international peace and security,"'48 and a new
International Security Council that would represent the inter-
ests of the world governments and be empowered to delay or
block certain specified actions by the new Executive Commit-
tee.
The final element would promote human rights and the
148. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
308 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XX:2
rule of law in international affairs by expanding the powers of
the global judiciary. All members would be required to accept,
without reservations, the general jurisdiction of the ICJ over
all international legal disputes. Furthermore, individuals
would be given access to the Court through a right of appeal
whenever rights protected under a Global Bill of Rights' are
implicated and the individuals have exhausted the legal pro-
cess under their national legal systems.
A. Promoting Democratic Governance
A UN pledge to support and promote democratic gover-
nance for each member state would entail granting a UN com-
mittee the power to review the credentials of representatives of
new governments claiming to exercise authority on behalf of
UN members. This measure would not affect a country's mem-
bership"5 ° in the organization; only the authority of the repre-
sentatives of new governments would be at issue. The "Creden-
tials Committee" would have the power to recommend to the
UN that representatives of governments that accede to power
149. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 74, would provide a basic starting
point for the elaboration of a Global Bill of Rights.
150. Membership in the UN has never been a matter of right' to every state.
While it was recognized from the beginning that the organization's success would
depend on its ability to attract the vast majority of countries to membership, the
leaders of the UN movement recognized that there would have to be some con-
ditions to admission. The Charter established two types of membership. The origi-
nal members were those who participated in the San Francisco Conference, signed
the UN Declaration and took the other steps necessary for membership. U.N.
CHARTER art. 3. Additionally, membership was open to "all other peace-loving
states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter" subject to a
recommendation of approval by the Security Council and actual approval by the
General Assembly. Id. art. 4, 2. Although arguably a non-democratic government
would, as a practical matter, be unable to meet many of the obligations created by
the Charter, there is in fact no textual Charter requirement that members be
democracies, nor has the imposition of such a requirement been the traditional
practice of the organization. In fact, early efforts to include as a condition that
members maintain "democratic institutions" were rejected. See generally RUTH B.
RuSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (1958) (UN practice gener-
ally has been to treat the issue of membership in purely political terms with little
attention paid to the character of the national government or to its treatment of
its citizens. In the first two decades of the UN's existence, during which member-
ship applications were sharply contested, few of the disputes centered on the ques-
tion of the applying government's commitment to democratic principles. Objections
to membership were largely grounded in the traditional quid pro quo of interna-
tional politics.).
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undemocratically be rejected. The Committee members would
be guided in their judgment by a set of criteria approved by
the members of the revitalized UN. The UN Charter, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (especially Article 21), and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (espe-
cially Article 25), would serve as the primary sources of these
standards.15'
A democratic guaranty would not constitute a major philo-
sophical departure for the UN. The Secretary-General and
representatives from many member nations have, on multiple
occasions, spoken directly and eloquently about democracy
being an essential ingredient for international peace and secu-
rity.'52 The guaranty would be a major shift only in how the
organization has treated the issue of the representation of its
members.
The UN Charter does not speak directly to the issue of
representation and each of the principal organs of the UN has
been free to develop its own rules regarding the credentials of
representatives.'53 The last time the organization had a sub-
stantive debate on the criteria that should be used for passing
on the credentials of representatives to the organization was in
1950, just prior to the great expansion in membership,' and
it failed then to resolve the matter. At that time, the Secre-
tary-General took the position that the key factors for consider-
ation were a government's effective authority over a territory
and the extent of its control over the population in the territo-
ry."'55 The British view was similar to this "objective ap-
151. U.N. CHARTER; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 74,
art. 21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 74, art.
25.
152. In an "exclusive interview" in the Russian Nezavismaya Gazeta Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali was quoted as advocating the advancement of democracy
and human rights through the offices of the organization. TASS, Sept. 17, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. "Democracy is not a model which
can be copied from some countries. It is a goal which all nations should seek to
attain. The same as human rights, it is of universal nature." Id. The Secretary-
General was further quoted in praise of the role of democracy in facilitating imple-
mentation of UN human rights policy and international peace. Id.
153. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 51; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1;
RUSSELL, supra note 150.
154. Between 1945 and 1965 the organization grew from 51 original members
to 117 members. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 86.
155. Secretary-General Trygve Lie's memorandum on the credentials issue advo-
cated the adoption of the "effective control" standard because the "United Nations
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proach" favored by the Secretary-General. Its aim was to di-
vorce the question of the recognition of representatives from
that of the approval of a particular government.'56 Other pro-
posals urged consideration of more subjective factors such as
consent of the governed and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms before the representatives of a govern-
ment are recognized. 5 ' The General Assembly eventually de-
is not an association limited to like-minded States and governments of similar
ideological persuasion (as in the case of certain regional associations). As an orga-
nization which aspires to universality, it must of necessity include States of vary-
ing and even conflicting ideologies." Letter Dated 8 March 1950 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council Transmitting a Memorandum on
the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations, U.N.
SCOR, 5th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. Sf1466 (1950), cited in Gregory H. Fox, The
Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 602
n.323 (1992). Additionally, he cited UN Charter Article 4: "Membership in the
United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obliga-
tions contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization,
are able and willing to carry out these obligations." Id. at 602 n.324.
The original text of Article 4 as debated at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference
required only that prospective members be "peace-loving states." At San Francisco
the additional requirements of adherence to the Charter were imposed, although
the suggestion by the Chilean and French delegations that members also be re-
quired to prove their internal support of "democratic institutions" was rejected as
a "breach of the principle of non-intervention' in the affairs of sovereign states."
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 1, at 88, (citing RUSSELL, supra note 150, at 844).
156. It was the British proposal to separate the peace-lovingness of an appli-
cant state from the ad hoc authority of the organization to determine the
applicant's ability to fulfill the state's UN obligations which eventually became
Article 4. RUSSELL, supra note 150, at 844.
157. At the time of the 1950 dispute over the admission of China, the Cuban
delegation's proposal listed the following as criteria for a government's membership
in the organization: "a) effective authority over the national territory; b) the gener-
al consent of the population; c) ability and willingness to achieve the Purposes of
the Charter, to observe its Principles, and to fulfill the international obligations of
the state; and d) respect for human rights and international freedoms." Recognition
by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State, U.N. GAOR Ad
Hoc Political Comm., 5th Sess., Agenda Item 61, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.38fL.6
(1950), cited in Fox, supra note 155, at 601 n.318.
Another proposal was the British variation on the "effective control" test,
requiring in addition that the applicant government enjoy "the obedience of the
bulk of the population of that territory, in such a way that this control, authority
and obedience appear to be of a permanent character." Id., cited in Fox, supra
note 155, at 601 n.318.
The final resolution, following a proposal by the Egyptian delegation, re-
quired:
[Wihenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled
to represent a Member State in the United Nations, and this question
becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, it should be
considered in light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the
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cided to leave the issue open for future resolution. The tradi-
tional UN practice ever since has been to routinely approve the
credentials of representatives of new governments whether it
be Idi Amin's, Pol Pot's or Pinochet's.
This practice was probably defensible in the Cold War era
when enough organizational energy was being expended on
other issues. Most of the struggle then was over admission to
membership. 5 ' Today, with some flexibility, the consider-
ation of a subjective criterion such as democratic governance in
deciding upon the credentials of national representatives
should be made a standard UN practice. Support for democra-
cy by the UN need not, at this time, include affirmative acts by
the organization to remove non-democratic regimes from pow-
er. For practical political reasons, existing non-democratic
regimes may have to be grandfathered. Individual members
should decide whether to sanction such regimes further.
Grandfathering would help deal with one of the principal
obstacles to the success of this proposal at present-China.
China's membership and positive participation in the UN are
vital to the success of the organization. By postponing judg-
ments about credentials until there is a change of government,
it might be possible to obtain the acquiescence of the current
ruling group in China. Hopefully, the ongoing internal and
external democratic pressures for change on the country would
eventually resolve the difficulties posed to a revitalized UN by
a non-democratic China.
Although this proposal may raise uncomfortable echoes of
cultural imperialism, recent events in the Third World show
that support for democracy-the so-called western variety-has
been overwhelming where people have been allowed a voice
and a choice.'59 UN actions to restore or promote democracy
have been greeted with popular enthusiasm. 6 ' Thomas Fran-
ck has noted the clear global consensus that has developed
circumstances of each case.
Id., cited in Fox, supra note 155, at 602 n.320; see also U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Polit-
ical Comm., 5th Sess., 57th mtg., Agenda Item 61, at 364-67, U.N. Doc. A/1292,
A/1308, A/1344, A/AC.38/L.45 (1950), cited in Fox, supra note 155, at 601 n.319.
158. RUSSELL, supra note 150.
159. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INTVL L. 46, 63 (1992).
160. Id. at 47.
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over the core elements of democracy:
Only a few, usually military or theocratic, regimes still resist
the trend [toward democracy]. Very few argue that parlia-
mentary democracy is a western illusion and a neocolonialist
trap for unwary Third World peoples. This almost-complete
triumph of the democratic notions of Hume, Locke, Jefferson
and Madison... may well prove to be the most profound
event of the twentieth century .... 11
Professor Franck identified more than 110 governments
which, as of late 1991, were legally committed in various de-
grees to "open, multiparty, secret-ballot elections with a uni-
versal franchise.""2 This commitment by governments-often
obtained after a sustained struggle by ordinary citizens-is evi-
dence of the growing acceptance, according to Professor
Franck, of the view that a government's legitimacy comes from
gaining the consent of the governed and the acknowledgment
of the community of nations.'63 Nowhere has this view re-
ceived greater acceptance than in Africa, where pro-democracy
movements have spread throughout the continent, capturing
domestic and international imagination with their unabashed
faith in, and promotion of, democracy.
Although there will be some disagreement over the specific
criteria to be applied, the benefits to the international commu-
nity of having such standards openly debated and explicitly
adopted must include raising the hopes of politically oppressed
people and discouraging aspiring dictators. It should also im-
prove the image of the UN which, in spite of its recent efforts
in Iraq, has for too long associated with representatives of
some of the world's most ignoble regimes. No one should un-
derestimate how much legitimacy an association with the UN
has provided to assorted tyrants. Affirmatively rejecting such
relationships should elevate the stature of the organization
which must begin to emphasize that it stands for something
beyond providing humanitarian assistance to the oppressed
and dispossessed. The UN should embrace the organizing force
of the ideology of democracy.
161. Id. at 49.
162. Id. at 47.
163. Id. at 46.
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B. Empowering the General Assembly
Two proposals aimed primarily at the composition of the
General Assembly would empower the organization and help
make it a more legitimate and effective force for international
peace and security. The proposals are: (1) to replace the cur-
rent one-country-one-vote system of equal representation with
one that apportions representatives and voting power on the
basis of each country's population and financial contributions
to the UN, and (2) to require that all representatives to the
UN be elected by direct universal suffrage.
1. Replacing the One-Country-One-Vote System
No single change to the UN structure could have a more
positive impact on the future of the organization than replac-
ing the current system of one-country-one-vote with one based
on the relative populations of members and their financial
contributions to the organization. A change from the current
one-country-one-vote system to one that factors in both nation-
al population and financial contributions to the UN system
would also reward those members that have found responsible
solutions to their political problems within their established
national frameworks and decrease the incentives to create new
sovereignties.
In 1966, a well-developed set of proposals to revise the
U.N. Charter and, among other things, to tie the composition
and voting rights of members in the General Assembly to na-
tional population was advanced by professors Grenville Clark
and Louis Sohn.' Unlike professors Clark and Sohn, I be-
lieve that a change that considers only the population of mem-
bers-but not their financial contributions-would continue to
reward the present culture of unreality, hypocrisy, and irre-
sponsibility that permeates so much of the UN today. A system
based exclusively on population, provides no incentives to the
major countries, who currently bear most of the organization's
costs, to support an expansion of the organization's powers to
the degree necessary for its revitalization. Moreover, a change
based only on population would serve to reward those nations
164. GRENVILLE CLARK & LoUIs SOHN, INTRODUCTION TO WORLD PEACE
THROUGH WORLD LAW (1973).
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that have not been able or willing to pursue rational popula-
tion management policies even when they lack the capacity to
provide for their rapidly increasing populations.
Taking population into account in deciding the composition
and voting power of UN members in the General Assembly
would of course require a change in the original scheme of the
UN which clearly gives primacy to the principle of the sover-
eign equality of all of its members.'65 The principle of sover-
eign equality is, however, an increasingly dangerous fiction.
When the world was split into two unrelenting rival camps, it
was a fiction that was perhaps worth tolerating. Today, howev-
er, we need a system that encourages countries to assume the
responsibility that should come with size and wealth. This is,
after all, a major justification for the establishment of the
Security Council with its five permanent members imbued
with veto powers.
The most tragic aspect of the myth of the sovereign equali-
ty of nations has been the way it has served to insulate the
more powerful nations from their greater responsibility to the
rest of the world. The principle of sovereign equality has en-
abled these nations to alienate themselves from human suffer-
ing occurring in other parts of the world, providing a ready
excuse not to act, or to act in only a limited manner. Thus, the
Idi Amins, the Pol Pots, and numerous other generals and
presidents-for-life, have all been accorded the privilege of rec-
ognition as sovereign heads of state and have been treated as
the equals of the leaders of long established democracies by the
UN system, even as they presided over brutalized and impov-
erished nations that were often totally dependent on interna-
tional aid. And of course being leaders of sovereign nations,
there was not much the rest of the world could do beyond peri-
odically providing relief or asylum to their victims. If we can-
not, at this time, end this farce, we must at least expose it.
A key motivation behind the Clark-Sohn proposals was to
make the major nations more willing to accept a more powerful
UN.'66 But Clark and Sohn also believed that even the small-
est nation should have a voice in the General Assembly and
that the smaller nations would be more likely to support the
165. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1).
166. CLARK & SOHN, supra note 164, at 3-5.
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proposal if an upper limit was placed on the number of repre-
sentatives any member would have. Thus, they qualified their
proposals by insisting that "no nation, however large, shall
have more than thirty representatives and even the smallest
nation shall have one representative."'67
The Clark-Sohn proposals make sense only up to a point.
There is no overwhelming reason to have all the so-called sov-
ereign entities in the world represented in the world body
regardless of their size or wealth. A floor should therefore be
added to the ceiling advocated by Clark and Sohn. As such, the
very small nations whose populations do not reach the mini-
mum number needed to entitle them to elect a representative
would have the option of joining with other nations in order to
satisfy this requirement. Furthermore, they may also qualify to
elect one or more representatives depending on their financial
contributions to the organization. This minimum population
requirement would reward international or intergroup coop-
eration. It would also help to discourage the ethnic separatism
now sweeping the globe.
The Clark-Sohn proposals established seven categories of
representation based on population. All nations within the
same category were allocated the same number of representa-
tives. Thus, the four largest nations at the time were grouped
into the first category and each nation was allocated thirty
representatives. The second category was made up of the ten
next largest nations, each receiving twelve delegates. In all,
the proposals provided for a total of 744 representatives divid-
ed among the 143 nations then in the world.'68
It is not necessary to create categories today to accomplish
the main object of this proposal. Clearly, an important reason
for the adoption of these categories was the fact that the Unit-
ed States, the Soviet Union and China were then conveniently
captured within the first category. Today, with the end of the
Cold War, there is less of an imperative for these nations to
have an equal number of representatives. A much simpler
scheme would allocate one representative to every nation or
group of nations that satisfies the established minimum popu-
lation size but that has no more than five to ten million people.
167. CLARK & SOHN, supra note 164, at 17.
168. CLARK & SOHN, supra note 164, at 17.
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Nations with more than five to ten million people but no more
than ten to twenty million would receive an additional repre-
sentative. Thereafter, a member would get one representative
for every additional five to ten million people with an upper
limit set as high as thirty. representatives. These numbers
would be adjusted to ensure that the UN is able to function in
an efficient manner.
In addition to the number of representatives assigned
according to population, a member would receive additional
representatives allocated on the basis of its financial contribu-
tion. A representative could be awarded for every 0.25 percent
of the UN budget contributed by a member or group of coun-
tries. In addition to establishing this one quarter of one per-
cent floor, an upper limit of thirty representatives per country
could be established in this case, similar to the limit set for
representatives awarded according to population. Thus, a na-
tion like the United States with a population of over 250 mil-
lion people, and contributing about twenty-five percent of the
UN budget, would receive the maximum of sixty delegates. A
country like Grenada with a population of just over 100,000,
and contributing virtually nothing to the UN budget would get
no representation unless it joined with other similarly situated
nations to reach the floor in either population or financial
contribution.
2. Direct Universal Suffrage for UN Representatives
The Clark-Sohn proposals called for the gradual introduc-
tion of a "system of full popular election."'69 This was to be
done in three stages: In the first stage, all representatives
were to be chosen by the respective national legislatures. In
the second stage, at least half the representatives would be
chosen by popular vote. In the third stage, all representatives
would be chosen by popular vote. Each of the first two stages,
according to the proposals, would last a minimum of twelve
years. Clark-Sohn also proposed a four-year term of service for
each representative. Save for the second stage, this system
should be adopted.
When Professors Clark and Sohn proposed full popular
elections for representatives to the revised UN General Assem-
169. CLARK & SOHN, supra note 164, at 19.
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bly, they did not have the benefit of the experience of the
EC. 7 ° Even though the 1957 Treaty of Rome called for the
direct popular election of members of the European Parlia-
ment, it took more than twenty years before this was accom-
plished. 7' Since 1979, however, when the first popular Euro-
pean Parliamentary elections were held, the influence of the
European Parliament has increased markedly. Direct universal
suffrage has given the Parliament, which has 518 members
who are elected every five years, "greater moral and political
authority."72 As a result, it is generally expected that- the
powers and prestige of the Parliament will continue to grow
even though the other less democratic institutions of the EC
are facing increasing criticism from many segments of the
Community. 73 The positive experience from the European
170. The European Community of today is the result of over four decades of
sustained efforts at European economic and political integration beginning with the
Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel community in 1951.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREA-
TY]. The foundation document of the Community, however, is the much broader
1957 Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. TREATY ESTAB-
LISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]. The Rome Treaty
has been modified and expanded by the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) and the
1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU). TREATY OF EUROPEAN UNION ITEU TREA-
TY]. The European Community has four major institutions: the European Court of
Justice, which is the Community's judicial arm; the Council, which is made up of
representatives of the governments of member states and has a mixture of execu-
tive, legislative and administrative powers; the Commission, which is composed of
seventeen appointed "bureaucrats" and performs most of the executive functions of
the community; and the Parliament, whose 518 members have been directly elect-
ed by universal suffrage since 1979. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 51-72 (1993). For more on the European
Community generally, see WILLIAM NICOL AND TREVOR C. SALMON, UNDERSTAND-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1990). For more on the Parliament, see FRANCIS
JACOBS ET AL., THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1990).
171. Treaty of Rome, Article 138 provides that "the representatives in the Eu-
ropean Parliament of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community
shall be elected by direct universal suffrage." EEC TREATY art. 138. For a brief
discussion of how the direct election of members of the European Parliament
evolved, see JACOBS ET AL., supra note 170, at 12-15.
172. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 170, at 12.
173. The growth in Parliament's powers is in response to what is seen as a
"democracy deficit" in Community decision-making. "Increased powers to the Parlia-
ment, directly elected by universal suffrage, would, so it is claimed, substantially
reduce the Democracy Deficit and restore legitimacy to the Community
decisionmaking process." J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE
L.J. 2403, 2467 (1991). Professor Weiler, however, goes on to challenge the notion
that increasing Parliament's powers would solve the legitimacy problem. Id. at
2472.
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Community, with a Parliament representing over 340 million
people in twelve nations, provides powerful support for acceler-
ating the Clark-Sohn proposal and beginning with a process in
which national legislatures would elect the representatives,
then moving to direct elections of all representatives to the
global legislature. It is time national leaders trust their citi-
zens to make democracy work on a global scale.
C. Reinventing the UN Security Council
The UN Charter gives the Security Council "primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security" and Chapters VI, VII, and VIII provide the fifteen-
member Council with specific powers to accomplish this task.
Recent Security Council actions-particularly against Iraq and
Libya and General Aidid in Somalia-confirm the breadth and
potency of these powers.1 4
During the Cold War, the potential for abuse of these pow-
ers and their essentially undemocratic nature was not at issue.
Indeed, the key concern then was the Council's inability to act
on controversial matters since the hostility between East and
West virtually assured institutional paralysis. Permanent
members on the Council routinely frustrated the resolution of
most major global issues.'75 This institutional paralysis, how-
ever also meant that the Security Council did not interfere in
the affairs of the smaller members of the organization. Today,
with the Security Council increasingly disposed to following
U.S. leadership, smaller nations are becoming more concerned
about the Council's powers, independence, and accountability.
Many of these nations now advocate changes to the Council
that would make it more representative of the membership of
174. For a discussion of Security Council actions against Iraq and General
Aidid in Somalia, see supra parts II.A, II.C. The Security Council also has im-
posed tough sanctions upon Libya with the aim of getting it to do the following:
(a) surrender two men suspected of involvement in the destruction of Pan Ameri-
can Airlines Flight 103; and, (b) cooperate with France in the investigation of
Libyan involvement in the bombing of a French airliner. S.C. Res. 751, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at 57, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992). Sanctions were
imposed after Libya failed to comply with an earlier resolution requiring accession
to American, British and French demands. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3033rd mtg. at 51, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992).
175. Between 1945 and 1990, there were 279 vetoes cast in the Security
Council. Agenda For Peace, supra note 2, at 4.
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the UN. Similar demands-albeit in more muted tones-have
been made by Germany and Japan who argue for greater rec-
ognition and powers that are commensurate with the leading
roles they are playing in international affairs.'76
The changes to the General Assembly proposed above
would undermine the logic of the current Security Council. A
UN General Assembly with a more equitable representational
and voting system, and one in which the representatives are
popularly elected, would be incompatible with a Security Coun-
cil that gives permanent membership to, and reserves special
veto powers for, a few countries.
Recognizing this, Professors Clark and Sohn had also pro-
posed to replace the present Security Council with an Execu-
tive Council composed of representatives elected by a reformed
General Assembly.'77 Under their scheme, the Executive
Council would be a seventeen person body responsible to the
General Assembly and its representatives would serve the
same four-year terms as the representatives in the General
Assembly.
The Clark-Sohn proposals made special provisions for
representing the interests of the larger nations within this new
16. Widespread dissatisfaction with thfe present Security Council's structure
has led to concrete suggestions that would make it a more legitimate and effective
body. One suggestion would replace the British and French seats on the Council
with a common European Community seat. Another suggestion calls for the ap-
pointment of one or more advanced developing countries like Brazil or India to a
permanent Third World seat on the Council. Still another idea would create a
class of rotating or semi-permanent members. Except for the proposal to give Ja-
pan and Germany permanent seats on the Council, none of these ideas have been
seriously considered by the current permanent members of the Security Council,
whose unanimous support would be needed for any successful reform effort. Czech
Leader Supports India on Security Council Membership, U.P.I., Feb. 7, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Ian Davidson, Germany Seeks to Join En-
larged Security Council, THE FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at 4; Pascal Fletcher,
Brazil Backs Expanded Security Council Membership, REUTERS, Mar. 8, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Library Report File; News Conference by
President Clinton and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, FED. NEWS SERV., June 2,
1994, at 8, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File; Thailand Backs More
Members for U.N. Security Council, THE XiNHAU NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 31, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File; U.S. Senate Cautious on Securi-
ty Council Expansions, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuter Library Report File; NZ Proposes U.N. Security Council Seating Reform,
THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
XINHUA File.
177. CLARK & SOHN, supra note 164, at 20.
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Executive Council. This meant devising a very complicated
voting procedure in the new Council. Under their scheme,
decisions of the Executive Council on "important matters"
would require the support of at least twelve of the seventeen
representatives on the Council, provided that those twelve
included both a majority of the representatives from the larger
nations and a majority of the representatives from the other
nations on the Council. 7 ' Such a complicated system of rep-
resentation and voting may not be needed for the new execu-
tive structure of the reformed General Assembly. A revitalized
and more democratic UN needs, to move away from the idea
that a few nations ought to be able to frustrate the work of the
organization even when the organization is operating clearly
within its jurisdiction. While it may be acceptable to insist
upon a super majority within the Executive Committee before
it acts on some matters, it is not acceptable that permanent
memberships or veto powers be retained for some nations with-
in a revitalized UN structure.
To ease the transition to this new system, the UN should
expand and transform the present Security Council into an
International Security Council (ISC), whose principal responsi-
bility would be to delay or, in the extreme case, halt actions of
the new Executive Committee. The ISC would increase the
permanent membership of the current Security Council, Japan,
Germany and at least two large, advanced, developing coun-
tries. Though dominated by the major powers in the same way
the present Security Council is dominated, the ISC would con-
tinue to have a cross section of the lesser powers as members.
In the ISC, each country would have one vote to be exer-
cised, as is presently the case, by a representative chosen by
its government. Unlike the present Security Council, however,
the ISC would not be an "activist" body and no country would
have a veto. Nor would the ISC purport to act on behalf of the
world community. Its primary function would be to serve as a
brake on the actions of the new Executive Committee where
such actions contravene the interests of several major powers.
The ISC could be empowered to overturn any Executive Com-
mittee action by a simple majority vote of its members.
The world's dominant powers undoubtedly would have
178. CLARK & SOHN, supra note 164, at 20.
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considerable difficulty accepting the replacement of the current
UN executive structure with one constituted without regard to
individual national concerns. The new ISC would help alleviate
these concerns. This hybrid structure-with the Executive
Committee representing the concerns and aspirations of the
peoples of the world, and the ISC, dominated by the major
powers, serving as a watchdog for the concerns of the world's
governments-would help revitalize the UN while giving due
recognition to the concerns of the governments that will pro-
vide the bulk of the financing and other resources for the orga-
nization.
D. Revitalizing the International Court of Justice
In establishing the International Court of Justice, the UN
held before a war-stricken world the beacons of law and jus-
tice, and offered the possibility of orderly judicial processes as
a replacement for the vicissitudes of war and the reign of brute
force.'79
Now, nearly fifty years after it was created, the ICJ's con-
tributions to the rule of law in international affairs has been
only slightly better than disappointing. Established in 1945 as
the principal judicial organ of the UN,' the ICJ was expect-
ed to play a leading role in ensuring one of the UN's funda-
mental principles-the peaceful settlement of disputes among
members."8' The ICJ has not had notable success, however,
in resolving the numerous violent conflicts that have plagued
the world since its founding.
It is now generally conceded that the ICJ's potential was
oversold by its supporters, many of whom had expectations
that, in the words of Richard Falk, are "now relevant mainly
as an exhibition of naive optimism.""'2 The deep reluctance of
the principal actors in a sovereignty-based world system to rely
179. U.N. Doc. 913, IV11174(1), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 393 (1945), quoted in RICH-
ARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 1 (1986).
180. U.N. CHARTER art. 92; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE art. 1; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 7 (identifying the Court as a principal
organ of the UN system); art. 93 (declaring all UN members ipso facto parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice); art. 94 (requiring each UN
member to comply with a decision of the Court "in any case to which it is a par-
ty").
181. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 3.
182. FALK, supra note 179, at 8.
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on judicial settlement or third-party adjudication of matters of
vital importance has not been eased by the passage of time or
by the end of the Cold War. The attraction for other methods
such as diplomacy and war remains too powerful.
Virtually every commentator on the limitations of the ICJ
has focussed on the limited acceptance of the Court's jurisdic-
tion-especially on the part of the permanent members of the
Security Council-as the principal source of the Court's
difficulties.'83
Any effort to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of
the UN must give priority to revitalizing the ICJ. While judi-
cial settlement is by no means the only way to foster the
peaceful settlement of international disputes--diplomacy, me-
diation and arbitration among others are well established
means -it is clear that any effort to ban the use of force in
the resolution of international disputes would suffer without
provisions for obligatory settlement of disputes.
A project to revitalize the ICJ would benefit from the nu-
merous suggestions for improvement that have accompanied
much of the discussions of its failures. Unfortunately, many of
those suggestions were made outside the context of a system-
wide revitalization of the UN. A better approach would inte-
grate the changes needed to revitalize the ICJ with those re-
quired for the other main UN organs. The legitimacy and effec-
tiveness of the UN as a political body would be enhanced by
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN as a judicial body
and vice versa.
While the expanded acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
183. The reasons behind the reluctance of states to be more supportive of
judicial settlement of international disputes have received extensive treatment. For
example, some commentators have pointed to the judicial philosophy and style of
the Court, highlighting a Western legal tradition or orientation that may have
been unattractive to "Third World" or Marxist perspectives. Commentators have
also identified the selection process and composition of the Court as either insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the representational needs of the global community or too
heavily politicized. See Barton & Carter, supra note 10, at 559-62. See generally
FALK, supra note 179.
184. The UN Charter, while creating a judicial body as one of the principal
organs of the organization, is careful to preserve the option of states to choose
other means of peaceful dispute settlement. Article 33 lists various peaceful dis-
pute settlement methods in no particular order of preference, and Article 95 affir-
matively preserves the right of members to use other tribunals to settle interna-
tional disputes. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33, 95.
322 [Vol. XX:2
19941 THE ROLE OF THE UN AFTER FIFTY YEARS 323
among UN members is generally regarded as the most impor-
tant single change that should be made to improve internation-
al dispute settlement, one other change would contribute to
this goal: allowing individuals direct access to the Court when
certain globally protected rights are at issue.
1. Expanding Compulsory Jurisdiction
The ICJ currently exercises jurisdiction only with the
consent of the state parties who bring disputes before it. No
independent authority or international law principle requires
any state to accede to the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither
membership in the UN nor accession to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice translates into an acceptance of
the jurisdiction of the Court without some additional indepen-
dent and affirmative action on the part of a state. However,
once a state consents to the Court's jurisdiction, international
law requires that it comply with the Court's decision."8 5
The statute of the ICJ provides two general means by
which the Court obtains jurisdiction over an international dis-
pute. The first covers "all cases which the parties refer to it
and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force."'
The second method-which is often inaccurately referred to as
the general compulsory jurisdiction of the Court-is in truth a
means by which a state may consent in advance, through a
unilateral declaration, to the Court's jurisdiction with regard to
a range of legal disputes. 7 Under this latter method, states
making unilateral jurisdictional declarations may do so uncon-
ditionally or with reservations. This optional means of confer-
ring jurisdiction was adopted as a compromise position be-
tween those who wanted true general compulsory jurisdiction
for the Court and those who wanted the Court's jurisdiction to
be at all times dependent upon the consent of the parties. The
traditional reference to this second means as compulsory juris-
diction is thus more a statement of aspirations than of reality
by those who support a strong, independent global judicia-
185. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, % 1; see SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT:
WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 81 (1989).
186. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, 1.
187. Id. % 2.
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The ineffectiveness of this second method is demonstrated
by the small number of states that have made the requisite
unilateral declarations, the generally restricted scope of such
declarations, and the frequency with which states have re-
neged on their declarations whenever the Court has relied on
such declarations for jurisdiction over disputes. Of the perma-
nent members of the Security Council, only the United King-
dom today has an effective declaration granting the ICJ "com-
pulsory jurisdiction." Fewer than 50 states out of a total UN
membership of 184 nations have availed themselves of this
method."9
The ideal of true compulsory jurisdiction did not die with
the compromise represented by Article 36, section 2. Interna-
tional law scholars and world leaders have made frequent
pleas for acceptance of the general compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court. Many of the appeals have been directed specifically
at the permanent members of the Security Council. A break-
through of a sort was achieved in 1987 when former Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev called for the recognition of the
Court's "mandatory jurisdiction ... by all on mutually agreed
upon conditions."'90 A recent proposal by former State De-
188. Former ICJ President Nagendra Singh has described the Statute of the
International Court of Justice Article 36, 2 as creating "a more limited class of
States who accepted compulsory jurisdiction as between themselves." NAGENDRA
SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 17
(1989). He saw each state as providing the court with a series of "blank cheques"
with no state able to cash such a cheque "unless it had itself deposited a similar
one with the Court." Id.
189. A number of states which may have made unilateral declarations have
simultaneously reduced the value of their declarations by including severe juris-
diction-limiting reservations. This practice is usually traced to the infamous
Connally Reservation contained in the United States jurisdictional declaration,
effective from 1946 to 1986. This reservation had excluded from the United States'
acceptance of the ICJ's jurisdiction disputes which were "essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of the United States, as determined by the United States."
Recognition of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Aug.
14, 1946, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1946, at 452-53.
When this reservation later proved inadequate to limit the ICJ's jurisdiction
in the Nicaragua Case, the United States-following the practice of several other
states under similar circumstances-simply withdrew its acceptance of the so-called
compulsory jurisdiction. DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1986, at 67.
190. SINGH, supra note 188, at 233 (quoting statements made by Mikhail
Gorbachev in an article published by PRAVDA & IZVESTIA on Sept. 17, 1987, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File).
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partment Counsellor Abraham Sofaer appears to be the U.S.
response to this call.' 9 ' The Sofaer proposal would expand ac-
ceptance of the World Court's jurisdiction by means of a new
treaty in which parties would specify in advance the treaties
and the subject matter over which the Court may exercise
jurisdiction.
In the present global climate, the barrier once posed by
the East-West conflict to the development of a strong, indepen-
dent global judiciary has been replaced by the more traditional
reluctance of sovereign states to have their vital interests put
in the hands of an independent non-political body. There can
be no reasonable expectation that states under the present
system would voluntarily and unconditionally accept the gener-
al compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. True compulsory jurisdic-
tion-an essential ingredient for a global community where the
rule of law is predominate-must be accompanied by the struc-
tural changes to the political bodies of the UN outlined above.
2. Providing Access to Individuals
The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides
that "only states may be parties in cases before the Court."'92
International organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and individuals are thus excluded from direct participation in
cases before the Court. The Statute demonstrates some consid-
eration for the interests of "public international organizations"
by allowing the Court to receive relevant information from
them either at the request of the Court or on their initia-
tive. 9 The Statute evinces no such concern for the interests
of the individual.
Under traditional understanding of international law, this
lack of concern was easily defended since only sovereign states
were regarded as possessing an international personality.'
Traditional international law focused on the interests of sov-
ereign states, not on those of individuals. It was up to an indi-
191. Abraham D. Sofaer, Adjudication in the International Court of Justice:
Progress Through Realism, 44 REC. B. CITY N.Y. 462, 477-83 (1989); see Lizzi,
Note, Delimiting the World Court's Jurisdiction: Realism in the Interest Of Prog-
ress, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L. 203 (1992).
192. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34, T 1.
193. Id. 2, 3.
194. ROSENNE, supra note 185, at 83.
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vidual's own state to decide whether to defend the interests of
that individual in the international sphere. While this provided
some measure of protection when an individual's interests
were violated by a foreign state, it left the individual virtually
defenseless when the violator was that individual's own gov-
ernment. As Professor Buergenthal describes it, "This state of
international law invited a conspiracy of silence. A country
could violate human rights with impunity because it knew that
other governments would not speak out in protest."19
The Second World War, and the Holocaust in particular,
accelerated a change in the conception of the individual's
status in international society. No one today argues seriously
against the idea and reality of the individual as a proper sub-
ject of international law. The UN Charter began a process of
constitutionalizing individual rights on a global basis. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and numerous other
global and regional human rights instruments have contribut-
ed to this process. Unfortunately, the UN system has not given
individuals direct access to the ICJ to further this changed
conception of the individual under international law. At the
San Francisco Conference, the major powers rejected individu-
al access to the World Court and prevented the creation of a
United Nations Court of Human Rights. 6 The Cold War en-
sured that any progress in this area would have to await its
resolution.
In the post-Cold War era, the UN's search for legitimacy
and effectiveness would receive an incalculable boost from a
change that would allow individuals access to the ICJ where
fundamental, globally recognized human rights are at issue.
Nothing could give the peoples of the world a greater stake in
the success of the UN system than the knowledge that it would
vindicate their vital individual interests where domestic insti-
tutions have failed. While this development would probably be
of most value to those who live in the more politically unstable
societies of the world-that is, the majority of the world's popu-
lation-its value to those in developed democratic societies
195. Thomas Buergenthal, The Human Rights Revolution, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J.
4, 5 (1991).
196. W. PAUL GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 45-49 (1966).
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should not be uriderestimated.
The experience of the Europeans, who have developed the
most comprehensive supranational judicial system for the
protection of individual rights, provides strong support for
changing the UN Charter and the International Court of
Justice's Statute to allow individual access to the Court. The
1950 European Human Rights Convention'97 created a Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights that can receive petitions
from individuals claiming to be the victims of state violations,
provided that the state charged has agreed in advance to rec-
ognize the competence of the Commission. 9 ' The Commission
was in turn empowered to bring a case that it cannot resolve
before a European Court of Human Rights, again provided that
the state party has recognized the jurisdiction of the Court.
Twenty seven nations are parties to the European Human
Rights Convention.'99
The EC, composed of only twelve nations, all of whom are
parties to the European Human Rights Convention, has a
separate judicial system-the European Court of Justice-with
even stronger protection for individual rights."0 The Europe-
an Court of Justice has actively expanded the rights of individ-
uals under Community laws using several legal devices. For
example, under the doctrine of directly effective Community
law, litigants in domestic forums are able to raise certain
rights guaranteed by the Community.2"' Thus, certain Com-
197. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5; see also Protocol [No. I] to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9; Protocol [No. IV] to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16,
1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46.
198. For an overview of the European human rights system, see Burns H.
Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 20
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1987).
199. As of December 1992 the countries that had ratified or acceded to the
Convention were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, March 20,
1959, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
200. On the European Community generally, see supra note 170. On the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in particular, see L. NEVILLE BROWN, THE COURT OF JUS-
TICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (3d ed. 1989).
201. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandes Administratie der
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munity rights, held to be directly effective by the European
Court of Justice, are enforceable in national courts. To ensure
that these rights are vindicated, the Court requires national
courts of last resort to refer questions concerning the interpre-
tation of Community laws or actions to it for final and binding
interpretation."' In this way, individuals who have exhaust-
ed their national remedies are generally able to gain access to
the Court when Community-protected rights are at issue.
The viability of these regional supranational judicial
schemes should provide sufficient support for embarking on a
course to provide individuals all over the world with access to
the ICJ to vindicate globally protected interests.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to maintain an optimistic view of the future
of the UN given current popular perceptions of the
organization's performance in recent post-Cold War civil and
international conflicts. In the Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia, and
Somalia, the UN has been asked to undertake inordinately
difficult tasks without the material or moral support necessary
for success. In none of those places has the UN involvement
contributed to a better perception of the organization's role in
global affairs. The initial success of the Gulf War to expel Iraqi
forces from Kuwait has been followed by a seemingly never-
ending war of nerves and attrition between Saddam Hussein
and the allied forces. Sanctions and "no fly zones" have failed
to mute Iraqi intransigence, to improve human rights or to
reduce tension in the region. In Yugoslavia, initial UN reluc-
tance to intervene gave way to an intervention that has in no
way improved the lot of the people or the image of the organi-
zation. In Somalia, a cantankerous warlord contemptuously
took on the UN and its principal benefactor, the United States,
and defeated them both on the battlefield and in the world of
public opinion.
Evidence of the UN's perceived failures in responding to
these and other similar conflicts has been used to stave off any
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
202. The Court derived this power from the Treaty of Rome, Article 177. EEC
TREATY art. 177. The Article also serves as one of the sources for the direct ef-
fects doctrine. Id.
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improvement in its capabilities, and indeed, to justify its
marginalization and demise. So what are supporters of the UN
to do in the present climate and in light of current trends?
Should they proceed in the cautious step-by-step manner pre-
ferred by the UN administration and reflected in the Agenda
For Peace report, or should they seek some other way to repair
the organization's deficiencies?
This article has argued for a decidedly more challenging
direction because of a recognition that the problems facing the
UN are not simply performance problems resulting from inade-
quate resources, but are more correctly problems of orienta-
tion, principles and faith. This article urges a return to the
foundation principles of the UN in an effort to breathe life into
the organization.
The Cold War did not extinguish the heroic desires of post-
Second World War thinkers for universal human rights and
the rule of law. Nor did the Cold War enervate the UN Char-
ter, which, perhaps for very good reasons, was allowed to sleep
this past forty plus years, but not to lapse or die.
The end of the Cold War provides an opportunity to awak-
en this glorious document and give true effect not only to its
text but also to its aspirations. The Agenda For Peace report
offers a good bureaucratic compromise but it tarries too long
near the past. The world must move resolutely toward the
future envisaged in the UN Charter. Professors Sohn and
Clark aided the task immeasurably over thirty years ago with
their suggestions for revitalizing the UN. This article has
adopted and expanded upon many of their ideas in order to
deal with the underlying problems confronting the UN in the
post-Cold War world.
If the UN is to survive and prosper in a meaningful capac-
ity, it must be revitalized in terms of its orientation and struc-
ture. This Article has focused on the three most important
organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Secu-
rity Council, and the International Court of Justice. All three
must be significantly altered to meet the challenges of today.
The General Assembly should directly recognize its responsibil-
ities to individuals and moderate the myth of sovereign equali-
ty by replacing the one-country-one-vote system with one that
takes population and wealth into account. The General Assem-
bly should also encourage a closer connection between the UN
and individuals by providing for the direct election of General
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Assembly representatives.
The Security Council should move beyond its present ar-
chaic structure to provide for swifter and surer actions in de-
fense of global peace and security. To deal with conflicting
national and universal concerns, an interim hybrid structure
which begins to democratize executive decision-making, while
providing some security for national interests, is recommended.
A revitalized and more powerful World Court is also essen-
tial. It would, at a minimum, have true compulsory jurisdiction
and provide for access by individuals under circumstances
where national courts have failed to protect rights recognized
under a global bill of rights.
These structural changes need one other ingredient to aid
the process of revitalizing the UN-a democratic guaranty.
Under this guaranty, the UN would reserve the right to reject
the credentials of governments that have attained or main-
tained power undemocratically, as defined by universally
agreed upon standards. People suffering under repressive re-
gimes should no longer have doubts as to how the global com-
munity-as represented by the UN-views their plight.
The fact that many of the changes suggested in this paper
would be viewed as unrealistic at the moment or even in the
near future is no excuse for not considering them. There are
numerous realistic proposals in existence. So far there is no
evidence that such realism has improved the capacity of the
UN to ensure global peace and security, or that it would do so
in the future. The world cannot afford the continuing decline of
the UN at a time when it is expected to play a central role in
ensuring global peace and security. Priority must be given to
arresting its decline. The proposals outlined in this Article
recognize the seriousness of the situation and the need for
fundamental change by challenging the global community to
live up to the ideals that gave birth to the UN nearly fifty
years ago.
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